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ABSTRACT 
 
Pricing is the process whereby a business sets the price at which it will sell its 
products and must be considered as a core part of the business's marketing plan. In recent 
years, there has been a growing awareness of the complex nature of price as a 
determinant of consumer decision making process. Recent research indicates there is no 
simple explanation of how price influences firm performance and individual consumer 
purchase decisions. The pricing strategy in traditional brick-and-mortar stores has 
received consistent attention from both academia and industry. However, as the raising of 
digital technology, the evolving business circumstance changed, or even re-introduced, 
many practically and theoretically important questions. Given this importance, the two 
essays tackle the strategic pricing strategy in the two critical perspectives of marketing — 
advertising and retailing.  
In the first essay, I explore the effects of displayed product price on keyword 
advertising performance in online shopping websites, as well as on consumers’ decision 
processes. With a hierarchical Bayesian model using a unique data set from a leading 
electronic shopping platform and a simulated experiment, I empirically test the 
asymmetric effects of price rank on advertising performances (i.e., click-through rates 
and conversion rates) in study one and the underlying mechanism in study two. 
Specifically, I find that consumers tend to click more on extreme price options (i.e., 
highest or lowest) in the early phases of the purchase funnel, which serve as anchors to 
evaluate a broad range of options. Clicks at later stages, which tend to convert to 
purchases, instead are more likely for moderately priced options, which offer a 
compromise across different product features. The effects of price rank diminish among 
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advertisements sponsoring more specific keywords but grow for those sponsoring more 
popular keywords. This essay demonstrates that the keyword advertisements provides a 
context for price comparison, which further influences consumers’ responses toward 
advertisements.  
While the first essay focuses on gaining competitiveness through enhancing the 
price competition in digital advertising context, the second essay focuses on avoiding 
price competition in multi-channel retailing context through switching the business focus. 
The second essay explores the causal effects of multi-channel retailer implementing 
cross-channel price integration. Leveraging a revised pricing policy implemented by one 
of the leading house appliance retailers, I empirically investigate how cross-channel price 
integration affects product sales and consumer preferences. This change of cross-channel 
pricing strategy reveals varying impact across time, products, channels, and customer 
segments. In the short term, price integration leads to a 14.70% decrease in sales of 
products without services but a 14.68% increase in sales of products with services. The 
price integration effect is more positive in the long run, such that sales of products 
increase by 10.07% without services and 36.07% with services. Further, using a latent 
class model with zero-inflated Poisson framework, I empirically differentiated the effects 
of price integration on three consumer segments with different preferences (i.e., lovers, 
haters and adaptors). The findings of the second essay contribute to the multi-channel 
pricing literature by providing an empirical examine of the effectiveness of cross-channel 
price integration and consumer migration.  
The findings of the two essays contribute to the pricing, keyword advertisements 
and multi-channel literature, and shed lights on the strategic implications of pricing 
iv 
 
activities. Specifically, the first essay connects the pricing literature, consumer search and 
keyword advertising literature by exploring the effects of contrast among displayed 
product prices in the keyword advertising context. This essay is among the first few to 
investigate how advertised product price affects advertising performance. The study 
suggests the advertised product price display two contrasting effects on consumers’ 
clicking and purchasing behaviors along their purchase funnel. In addition, the research 
extends understanding of two keyword characteristics by theoretically differentiating 
keyword specificity and keyword popularity. The second essay connects the multi-
channel pricing literature and transaction value literature by empirically examine the 
effects of retailers implementing cross-channel price integration policy. Advancing prior 
research on perceived transaction value and multi-channel pricing literature, this research 
proposes two contrasting mechanisms (i.e., price change and pricing consistency), 
through which the cross-channel price integration affects the product sales and consumer 
sales. The empirical findings shed lights on managerial implications to multi-channel 
retailers. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Price is the one element of the marketing mix that produces revenue; the other elements 
produce costs… [Price] also communicates to the market the company’s intended value 
positioning of its product or brand.  
– Philip Kotler (2011, p. 383) 
Pricing is the process whereby a business sets the price at which it will sell its 
products. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness of the complex role of 
price as a determinant of a purchase decision. The pricing strategy in traditional brick-
and-mortar stores has received consistent attentions from both academia and industry 
(e.g., Phillips 2005; Varian 1980; Varian 1989; Winer 1986). However, as the raising of 
digital technology, the evolving business circumstance reshaped, and even re-introduced, 
many practically and theoretically important pricing questions (e.g., Ratchford 2009; 
Verhoef et al. 2015). Given the importance and ubiquity nature of pricing, it is important 
to extend our understandings in pricing strategy in the evolving marketing contexts. 
In this dissertation, the two essays tackle the pricing issues across two important 
marketing domains — advertising and retailing, under the two emerging business 
contexts — online and multi-channel retailers. The first essay focuses on the 
competitively pricing strategy in digital advertising. I explored the effects of displayed 
product price on the advertising performances in keyword advertising. Relying on 
purchase funnel model (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1989; Roberts and Lattin 1991) and two 
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behavioral heuristics, i.e., anchoring effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and 
compromising effect (Simonson and Tversky 1992), the first essay investigates the 
effects of advertised product price rank on the advertising performances, i.e., click-
through rates and conversion rates, along with the moderating effects of two keyword 
characteristics. This essay demonstrates that the sponsored lists in keyword advertising 
provides a context for consumer to compare prices, which further influences consumers’ 
responses toward the advertisements. Managerially, the first essay sheds light on the 
competitively pricing strategy in the sponsored keyword advertising so that strategically 
pricing the products will improve the efficiency or overall traffic of search 
advertisements. 
While the first essay focuses on direct price competition through strategic price 
contrast, the second essay focuses on reducing price competition through differentiating 
shopping experience. The second essay contrasts two prevalent pricing strategies among 
multi-channel retailing industry. Relying on the perceived transaction value framework 
(Zeithaml 1988), the second essay explores the causal effects of cross-channel price 
integration, through which the price of an identical product is kept consistent across 
channels, on the product and consumer sales. The results suggest that the cross-channel 
price integration initiate the immediate sales decreases and overtime sales increases, 
resulting from both the shift of target consumers (i.e., from price focused to experience 
focused consumers) and the attitude change of other consumers. In addition, the product 
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associated with coordinated specialty services help the products to recover much faster 
from the immediate sales loss. This essay suggests that the two contrasting pricing 
strategies identify distinct strategic focuses, where channel-specific pricing strategy focus 
on the “better prices” while the consistent pricing strategy focus on the “smoother” and 
“easier” shopping experience. Based on the target consumer segments, product types and 
strategic focuses, the multi-channel retailers should select the corresponding pricing 
strategy.   
The two essays contribute to the pricing, keyword advertisements and multi-channel 
literature, and offers insightful strategic implications. Specifically, the first essay 
proposes to connect the pricing and keyword advertising literature by exploring the 
effects of displayed product price along consumer purchase funnel in the keyword 
advertising context. This essay is among the first to investigate how the product prices of 
keyword advertisements affects consumer decision process and advertising performance. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the displayed product price display two contrasting 
effects depending on the consumers’ decision process and heterogeneity. The second 
essay contributes to the multi-channel pricing strategy literature by empirically examine 
causal effects of retailer implementing cross-channel price integration, resulting in the 
switch from channel-specific pricing to consistent pricing strategy. This research is 
among the first few researches to empirically investigate the dynamic effects of adopting 
consistent pricing strategy, in contrast to channel-specific pricing strategy. The research 
4 
 
suggests that all products suffer in the short run but benefit in the long run, as the results 
of consumer attitude evolvement and the changes of target consumer segments.  
In sum, the two essays investigate theoretically and managerially important issues 
regarding pricing strategy under the emerging business contexts. The findings of the two 
essays jointly contribute to the pricing literature by building the bridge between classic 
pricing theories with the evolving business circumstances.  
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ESSAY ONE: The Effects of Price Rank on Clicks and Conversions of Sponsored 
Keyword Advertising in Online Retail Platforms 
1.1 Abstract 
Sponsored keyword advertising serves as a channel for firms to communicate with 
consumers. Noting the critical role of price information in consumers’ decision making, 
this study investigates price as a factor that affects consumers’ responses to such 
advertising throughout the purchase funnel, along with the moderating effects of two 
keyword attributes. With a hierarchical Bayesian model using a unique data set from a 
leading electronic shopping platform and a simulated experiment, the authors find that 
consumers tend to click more on extreme price options (i.e., highest or lowest) in the 
early phases of the purchase funnel, which serve as anchors to evaluate a broad range of 
options. Clicks at later stages, which tend to convert to purchases, instead are more likely 
for moderately priced options, which offer a compromise across different product 
features. The effects of price rank diminish among advertisements sponsoring more 
specific keywords but grow for those sponsoring more popular keywords. These findings 
provide new insights on the role of price information and managerial implications for 
devising effective sponsored keyword advertising strategies.  
Keywords: sponsored keyword advertising, price rank, keyword specificity, keyword 
popularity, click-through rate, conversion rate, consumer purchase funnel 
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1.2 Introduction 
Consumers rely on price as a critical input to assess the value of products in choice 
sets (Kalwani et al. 1990; Rajendran and Tellis 1994). In online retailing settings, firms’ 
pricing strategies often are particularly dedicated to consumers who are sensitive to price 
information (Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003; Lynch Jr and Ariely 2000), such that retail 
search engines frequently offer sponsored search advertising display results that also 
feature price comparison tools. They thus support comparison shopping, in that the search 
engines collect product information, including prices, from retailers, then display the 
collected, comparative information in response to shoppers’ queries. Prior research notes 
the influences of rank positions (Agarwal et al. 2011; Narayanan and Kalyanam 2015; 
Rutz et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2011), competition (Yang et al. 2013), and budget allocations 
(Sayedi et al. 2014) on the outcomes, but despite potentially meaningful implications, 
limited search advertising literature addresses how product prices in a display list affect 
the performance of sponsored keyword advertising. In this sense, firms’ pricing strategies, 
especially as they relate to the prices of competing products, remain unexplored.  
This gap is particularly relevant because firms predict what prices their competitors 
will charge in their advertisement and then adjust their own prices in order to get the 
desired price rank. Using purchase funnel and dynamic models of consumer choice 
(Hauser and Wernerfelt 1989; Nedungadi 1990; Roberts and Lattin 1991; Simonson and 
Tversky 1992), I propose that clicks can be driven by different motivations of consumers, 
including exploratory searches to develop anchors and the need for compromise among 
product features across the phases of the purchase funnel. Specifically, consumers 
develop anchors for comparison by exploring extreme priced options first, then make 
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actual purchase decisions by evaluating moderately priced options, to achieve an 
appealing compromise between product quality and price. I accordingly conduct two 
complementary studies.  
In the first, I investigate aggregated keyword search advertising responses (i.e., click 
and conversion), depending on the price rank of the search results in an online retailer’s 
website. Using detailed information about 207,407 keyword advertisements from a 
leading electronic shopping platform, I show that the price rank functions as an anchor 
that consumers use to develop their expectations and assess alternatives; it also helps 
them find a compromise between price and quality before making a purchase decision. I 
include moderating effects of two keyword attributes (specificity and popularity), which 
can identify consumer segments and reflect different preferences associated with search 
topics (Jeziorski and Segal 2015). Greater specificity indicates that consumers have 
developed more detailed preferences (Adaval and Wyer 2011); popularity reveals the 
extent to which consumers’ needs and preferences are common in the market (Jerath et al. 
2014). Depending on the specificity and popularity of keywords, consumers likely react 
differently to product prices displayed on a keyword search result page.  
In Study two, I conduct an experiment to verify the within-consumer variations 
across groups with different orientations in keyword search behaviors. Clickstream data 
from 310 consumers reveal that for search-and-buy consumers, consumers’ focus shifts 
along the purchase funnel that early-stage clicks are more likely to be driven by searches 
that aim to build anchors with extremely priced options, whereas this tendency 
diminishes for late-stage clicks, which often convert to purchases and thus are driven 
more by the need to find a compromise between product price and quality with 
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moderately priced options. For search-only consumers, they have a tendency to click 
extremely priced items across the search process. Clickstream data also shows that the 
conversion rate is higher for moderately priced products than for extremely priced ones.   
With this novel investigation of advertised product prices in sponsored keyword 
advertising, I make several contributions. The analysis of price ranks within a sponsored 
listing in Study 1 reveals how the price information contained in sponsored keyword 
advertising affects advertising performance. The experiment in Study 2 confirms the 
mechanisms that the preferences for extreme priced options are dominant in early phases 
of the purchase funnel, but moderately priced options are more prevalent when 
consumers have a specific purchase goal, as in the later phases of the purchase funnel 
when they seek to choose the most feasible alternative. Furthermore, this paper expands 
understanding of how keyword specificity and popularity each interact with price ranks to 
influence the performance of sponsored keyword advertisements. Both keyword 
attributes reflect market characteristics, in terms of the development of consumer 
preferences and potential market size.  
Since firms have control of their own pricing policy, they can adjust their own prices 
to get desired price rank. Once there are changes in the prices of competitors’ sponsored 
listings, they could react in real time without the limitation of the ad platform. Using the 
theoretical foundation and empirical findings of this paper, firms can develop more 
nuanced sponsored keyword advertising strategies. In a post hoc analysis, I determine 
that for firms that target consumers who search for popular and general keywords and 
that want to increase the absolute number of clicks and conversions, achieving an 
extremely low price rank should be a primary consideration. If instead these firms seek 
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efficiency and enhanced profitability, they should pursue a moderate price rank. Finally, 
firms that target a segment of consumers using niche and specific keywords do not need 
to consider price rank. 
 
1.3 Relevant Literature 
Search advertising literature primarily addresses two aspects: display and keyword 
attributes (see Table 1). General research questions focus on the effects of page rank 
positions and keyword attributes on consumers’ choices and purchases (Agarwal et al. 
2011; Animesh et al. 2011; Chan and Park 2015; Ghose and Yang 2009; Jerath et al. 
2014; Jerath et al. 2011; Narayanan and Kalyanam 2015; Rutz et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2011; 
Yang et al. 2013). For example, a ranking in the top position prompts the highest click-
through and conversion rates (Animesh et al. 2011; Jerath et al. 2011; Narayanan and 
Kalyanam 2015; Rutz et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2011), but the high costs of reaching this 
position reduce its economic benefits (Ghose and Yang 2009). In studies of keyword 
attributes, keyword specificity has emerged as a moderator between advertising position 
and consumer choice (Table 1), because the specificity of search queries signals the 
customer’s involvement and segment; more specific queries weaken position effects 
(Agarwal et al. 2011; Narayanan and Kalyanam 2015). In addition, keyword popularity 
may offer another moderator; though it has received somewhat less attention, Jerath et al. 
(2014) find that the search volume of a keyword decreases consumers’ focus on 
sponsored, relative to organic, search results. 
Other display attributes require further consideration though. In particular, I know 
little about the effect of product prices on adverting performance, even though consumers 
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take price into consideration carefully when making purchase decisions (Chevalier and 
Goolsbee 2003; Lynch Jr and Ariely 2000). The influence of product prices on 
consumers’ behaviors might be predicted by the keywords that those consumers use for 
their searches. Therefore, I investigate product price as a display attribute and consider its 
interaction with keyword attributes to uncover the effects on consumers’ responses to 
sponsored keyword advertising. Furthermore, prior literature    mainly investigates 
behavioral variations among consumer segments (i.e., between-consumer variations) 
(Animesh et al. 2011; Chan and Park 2015; Jerath et al. 2014), but little is known about 
behavioral variations within individual searches (i.e., within-consumer variations). I 
investigate mechanisms underlying the empirical patterns of advertising responses by 
considering both between-consumer variations across consumer segments and within-
consumer variations in individual search processes. 
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Jerath et al. (2004) Analytical models and 15-day 
records from a leading search 
engine firm in Korea in July 
2008
Advertising position, firm 
quality and advertising cost
Economic value of 
advertising position and 
firms' bidding strategy
A superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and obtain a position 
below it, yet it still obtains more clicks than the inferior firm. The inferior 
firm wants to be at the top where more consumers click on its link, 
whereas the superior firm is better off by placing its link at a lower position 
under both pay-per-impression and pay-per-click mechanisms. 
Ghose and Yang 
(2009)
Six-month panel data set from 
a large nationwide retailer that 
advertises on Google in 2007
Click-through rates, 
conversion rates, advertising 
cost, and 
advertising position
Economic value of 
advertising position and 
firms' bidding strategy
Click-through rate and conversation rate are positively related to 
advertising position. But topmost position might not be economic 
optmized, whereas middle position usually has higher economic return
Agarwal, Hosanagar, 
and Smith (2011)
Field experiment on 
Google.com for 45 days in 
2009
Click-through rate, conversion 
rate, advertising position
Economic values of 
advertising position and 
moderating effect of 
keyword specificity
Click-through rate decreases with position, conversion rate increases with 
position and is even higher for more specific keywords.
Animesh, 
Viswanathan, and 
Agarwal (2011)
Field experiment in conjunction 
with a firm in the mortgage 
industry
Advertising position, click-
through rate, advertising 
creativity and competitive 
intensity
Consumer segmentation, 
performance of advertising 
position, and competition
Sponsored search listings can act as an effective customer segmentation 
mechanism, and the effects on click-through rate advertising rank are 
strongly moderated by the seller’s ability to differentiate itself from its 
rivals.
Jerath, Ma and Park 
(2014)
Individual-level click data from 
a leading search engine firm in 
Korea.
Keyword popularity and 
clicks
Organic and sponsored 
search displays and search 
advertising strategy
Consumers’click activity after a keyword search is low and heavily 
concentrated on the organic list. However, searches of less popular 
keywords (i.e.,keywords with lower search volume) are associated with 
more clicks per search and a larger fraction of sponsored clicks.
TABLE 1  
Review of Selected Prior Research and the Contributions of this Study
Authors Research Context Key Variables Research Focus Findings
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Yang, Lu and Lu 
(2014)
Aggregate data on 1,573 
keywords  from a leading 
online market maker outside 
the United States 
Click-throughs, CPC, 
Number of advertisers
The effects and determinants 
of competition on click 
volume and CPC
The number of advertisers has a positive effect on the baseline click 
volume, has an inverse-U relationship with the mean decay factor, and has 
a negative and convex effect on the mean value of clicks; competition 
generally hurts advertisers but benefits the paid-search host.  
Chan and Park 
(2015)
Data from a leading search 
engine in Korea in 2008
Clicks and advertising position Consumer segmentation and 
economic value of 
advertising position
Users in the larger, low-involvement segment are less likely to click 
sponsored links but more likely to stop the search. In contrast, users in the 
smaller, high-involvement segment are more likely to click multiple links 
and less likely to stop the search. 
Narayanan and 
Kalyanam (2015)
Data from a large online 
retailer of consumer durables.
Advertising position, click-
through rate, sales order,  
seller size, prior experience 
and brand equity
Performance of advertising 
position and its moderators
Advertising position positively affects Click-through rates, but has similar 
effect on sales order on the advertisements on the first page. The position 
effect further depends on seller size, prior experience, and brand equity.
Agarwal and 
Mukhopadhyay 
(2016)
360 keywords with 1,267
advertiser keyword in Yahoo 
2008
Advertising position, click-
through rate, conversion rate, 
keyword specificity and ad 
quality
The impact of competing 
ads on the click 
performance
First, competing high-quality ads have a lower negative effect on the click 
performance as compared to competing low-quality ads. Second, the 
negative effect of competing high-quality ads decreases at low positions as 
compared to high positions. Furthermore, this decrease in the negative 
effect of competing high-quality ads is more substantial for specific 
keywords.
Im et al. (2016) Search transactions of 11,001 
keywords from a  sponsored 
search engine channels in 
2010.
brand-seeking vs. deal-
seeking, search vs. experience 
goods
The effects of keyword type 
(deal- vs. brand-seeking) 
and product type on 
advertising performances
First, search queries containing deal-seeking keywords are associated 
with higher click-through rates and conversion rates than are search 
queries without such keywords. Second, the positive effect of deal-
seeking keywords on click-through rates is more pronounced for 
experience goods than for search goods. 
TABLE 1  (Cont')
TABLE 1  (Cont')
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Du, et al. (2017) Daily aggregates of sponsored 
search advertising from a 
major Chinese online B2C 
retailer that advertises on 
Google
Advertising position, click-
through rate, conversion rate, 
cost-per click, and keyword 
characteristics
Performances of different 
keyword categories and 
match types.
First, relativetogenerickeywords, focal-brand keywords are associated 
with higher CTRs and higher CRs, while competing-brand keywords are 
associated with lower CTRs; Second, keyword match types are also 
important and that their effects differ for the three keyword categories.
Gong, Abhishek and 
Li (2018)
4.6 million search impressions 
of 12,790 keywords in Google 
2007.
Advertising position, click-
through rate, keyword 
ambiguity
The effect of keyword 
ambiguity on ad 
performance
Higher keyword ambiguity is associated with higher CTR on top-
positioned ads, but also a faster decay in CTR with screen position.
This study Display-level data from a 
leading online shopping 
platfrom in 2014
Price ranks, click-through 
rates, conversion rates, 
keyword specificity and 
keyword popularity
Influence of price rank on 
advertising performance, 
and the moderators
Consumers tend to click the advertising display with extremely high or low 
prices and purchase the product of the advertising display with middle 
prices. These effect further depends on keyword specificity and 
popularity.
TABLE 1  (Cont')
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1.4 Theoretical Background 
1.4.1 Purchase Funnels of Search Advertisements 
Consumers develop and modify their preferences on the basis of a choice set, such 
as the list of sponsored advertisements obtained from a search (Bettman et al. 1998; 
Payne et al. 1992). Consumers’ responses to price ranks in keyword search 
advertisements likely shift, depending on whether they are conducting exploratory 
information searches that build expectations, actively engaging with a specific 
advertising sponsor, or approaching an actual purchase (Bettman et al. 1998; Kalwani et 
al. 1990). The purchase funnel model and dynamic views of consumer choice suggest 
that consumer behaviors vary across purchase stages (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1989; 
Nedungadi 1990; Roberts and Lattin 1991; Simonson and Tversky 1992), due to the 
complexity of the decision process and consumers’ efforts to reduce that complexity. 
Prior literature also specifies that to simplify complex decision-making processes, 
consumers alter their behaviors according to phases (Shocker et al. 1991), such that their 
multi-phase decision process involves a series of hierarchical or nested choice sets. In 
different phases, consumers express different preferences and behave according to 
various patterns (Alba and Chattopadhyay 1985). 
Building on consumer decision literature, I consider two specific behavioral patterns 
and the corresponding mechanisms for search and purchase decisions that in turn affect 
consumers’ responses to sponsored keyword advertisements. That is, I expect that the 
prevalence of the two mechanisms varies across different phases of the purchase funnel 
during the search process and for consumers with different orientations or goals.  
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1.4.2 Anchoring Effects for Information Searches  
When consumer preferences are ambiguous, preferences evolve through an 
anchoring-and-adjustment process (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989; Hoch and Deighton 
1989). Both anchoring and adjustment processes, as postulated by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974), occur when people judge a stimulus along an attribute dimension with 
some uncertainty. Given the vastness of a universal set and their limited information 
processing capability, consumers usually select extreme values along this dimension as 
anchors, then adjust their expectations to arrive at a value that seems plausible. The 
extremes serve as anchors that help consumers learn the large universal set efficiently at 
the first glance; then they might gradually move to non-extremes to further their search 
process. That is, extreme prices, whether at the highest or lowest point, anchor 
consumers’ price perceptions (Kalwani et al. 1990), such that consumers use them as 
reference points for searches made with uncertainty (Epley and Gilovich 2006). Krishna 
et al. (2006) show that extremely priced products, among a set of more moderately priced 
options, affect the reservation price for a moderately priced target product in the same 
category. This anchoring effect is particularly influential when the products are more 
closely related and presented contiguously (Krishna et al. 2006). An explicit comparison 
of products against the price anchor activates consideration of product features available 
at this price, which then influences consumers’ willingness to pay (Adaval and Wyer 
2011). After reviewing the extreme options, consumers identify key product features that 
they want to compare and develop expectations about those identified features to inform 
their purchasing decisions.  
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1.4.3 Compromise Effects for Purchases 
Starting from a universal set, consumers interested in buying a product narrow down 
their consideration set and focus on a subset of plausible alternatives. In contrast with an 
anchoring effect, a compromise effect implies that brands gain more share when they 
represent an intermediate rather than extreme option in a choice set (e.g., Chernev 2004; 
Dhar et al. 2000; Kivetz et al. 2004b). When consumers are closer to a purchase decision, 
they likely pay more attention to moderately priced products, which represent viable 
options along the entire spectrum of available products and enable consumers to make 
compensatory trade-offs among the available options (Chernev 2004; Dhar et al. 2000).  
1.4.4 Consumer Responses: Click-Through Rates and Conversion Rates 
Consumers’ responses to sponsored keyword advertising include clicking and 
converting (Jerath et al. 2014). Consumers search alternatives and select one with the 
highest utility. By clicking the sponsored links, consumers retrieve information from the 
sponsored advertisement, using exploratory searches to find generic information about 
products, which they can leverage to develop their expectations and evaluate alternatives. 
Conversion implies more active, engaged purchase behaviors.  
Clicks for building anchors versus compromising. The intrinsic purpose of keyword 
searches (i.e., seeking information about a topic) implies that consumers develop anchors 
to evaluate the alternative products displayed in the keyword search results. Clicking 
behaviors support the development of anchors particularly in the early stages of the 
purchase funnel. Clicking a sponsored display involves minimal engagement, and the 
basic information allows consumers to derive expectations about products of interest. 
According to anchoring effect theory (Krishna et al. 2006), consumers pay more attention 
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to extreme prices to develop references, because these extreme options are more 
informative as anchors, enabling consumers to identify desired quality or prices and 
compare products along those features (Epley and Gilovich 2006). The high price of a 
product can reflect high quality, whereas the low price of a product can compensate for 
low quality. Thus, the extremely priced products, either high or low, may or may not be 
considerable choices for clicks, depending on consumers’ preferences and budgets. 
In contrast, consumers might click moderate options to find a compromise between 
product price and quality at the stages closer to the decision in the purchase funnel. The 
net effect then depends on the relative strength of these two contrasting roles for clicks. 
In general, it takes more time and more clicks to conduct exploratory searches, whereas 
clicks for purchase decisions likely occur only at the last stage of the purchase funnel. 
Previous findings similarly establish that conversion rates are much lower than click-
through rates (Agarwal et al. 2011; Rutz et al. 2012; Yang and Ghose 2010). Therefore, I 
anticipate that clicking behaviors are driven more by the exploratory need to build 
anchors, rather than a need for compromise, and consumers click on extreme-priced 
displays more than moderately priced ones to develop these anchors. Formally,  
H1: Price rank has a U-shaped effect on consumers’ click-through rate on a displayed list 
of sponsored keyword advertising, such that the click-through rate is higher for extremely 
priced products than for moderately priced ones.  
Conversions with compromises. Consumers consider products with different features 
from among the results of their keyword searches, though all the products likely represent 
the same category. Conversion requires deep customer engagement, beyond exploratory 
searches, because consumers seek to determine if a product option meets their specific 
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needs or which needs a specific option might serve. According to compromise effect 
theory (Chernev 2004; Dhar et al. 2000; Kivetz et al. 2004a), consumers seek trade-offs 
among product features to make a purchase decision, for which product prices and quality 
are two primary concerns (Feinberg and Huber 1996; Mehta et al. 2003). However, 
product quality is difficult to observe in a sponsored search advertising context, so 
consumers might infer quality from product prices, with the belief that a higher price 
indicates better quality (Feng and Xie 2012). Thus, conversions involve more 
compromise than exploratory searches, and they should be more likely in response to 
moderately priced products than extremely priced options with the highest or lowest 
prices. I predict: 
H2: Price rank has an inverted U-shaped effect on consumers’ conversion rate for the 
displayed list of sponsored keyword advertising, such that the conversion rate is higher 
for moderately priced products than for extremely priced ones. 
1.4.5 Moderating Effect of Search Keyword Characteristics 
Keyword attributes could provide a basis for consumer segmentation. Keywords that 
a consumer uses for online searches reveal his or her shopping stages and goals as well as 
the breadth of the market (niche vs. mass) (Jeziorski and Segal 2015). In particular, 
searches reflect two aspects of consumers’ preferences. First, consumers differ in their 
specific needs and shopping goals, so they use different search keywords (Chan and Park 
2015; Du et al. 2015; Jerath et al. 2014; Rutz and Bucklin 2011; Rutz et al. 2011). The 
specificity of the search keywords signals consumer traits, according to the level of detail 
associated with those keywords (Narayanan and Kalyanam 2015). Second, search 
keywords can provide estimates of the size of the market that might be interested in the 
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related topics (e.g., niche vs. mass). Keyword popularity, or the extent to which the 
keywords are used commonly by consumers in their searches (Jerath et al. 2014), thus 
can indicate the size of the market segment. 
Keyword specificity. I argue that keyword specificity reflects the depth of search, 
and deeper search reduces the influence of product prices on decision making. Because 
more specific keywords cover a narrower range of products, searchers likely have a clear 
idea of the products they want (e.g., “automatic neck massager”), whereas less specific 
keywords contain only a rough product description (e.g., “massager”). The use of more 
specific keywords corresponds to more specific preferences for the products for which 
consumers are searching, as reflected in the additional constraints on the search queries. 
In contrast, less specific keywords imply searches for information without specific 
shopping goals (Jerath et al. 2014; Rutz and Bucklin 2011). In preference construction, 
extreme-priced products have a more critical anchoring function when consumers lack 
specific preferences or are not familiar with the topic (Biswas and Blair 1991). In terms 
of decision making, consumers with specifically defined preferences have less need to 
compromise among the product features to choose the product that meets their already 
specific preferences (Dhar et al. 2000). That is, consumers using specific keywords have 
a weaker need for anchors to evaluate a wide spectrum of options, and they are more 
reluctant to compromise product features to avoid uncertainty. In contrast, consumers 
with general or no preferences, reflected in general keywords, rely more on the product 
price to anchor the market spectrum or compromise among product features to avoid 
risks. I thus predict a moderating effect of keyword popularity, such that the U-shaped 
20 
 
effect of price ranks on clicks and the inverted U-shaped effect of price ranks on 
conversion rates grow flatter with greater keyword specificity.  
H3: Keyword specificity weakens the U-shaped effect of price ranks on the click-through 
rate, making the effect flatter. 
H4: Keyword specificity weakens the inverted U-shaped effects of price ranks on the 
conversion rate, making the effects flatter. 
Keyword popularity. A keyword’s popularity relates directly to its advertising value, 
which determines competition in the display list. Greater popularity means that more 
consumers are interested in the topic, so advertisers compete more intensely for this large 
market. The intense competition in turn drives marketers to advertise their best-selling 
products and design advertisements in the most attractive way, such that consumers 
encounter all-attractive choice sets. With all these attractive alternatives, it becomes 
difficult for consumers to narrow down the consideration sets efficiently, and consumers 
have a greater need for signals to guide product searches and purchases. Product price, 
which are likely in accordance with operational costs and product positioning strategies, 
offers an intuitive, efficient indicator that consumers can use to develop their 
expectations across the purchase funnel (Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Monroe 1973). In 
contrast, less popular keywords likely imply a niche market, in which consumers already 
encounter a clearly distinguishable choice set with products that offer varying non-price 
quality signals (Dalgic and Leeuw 1994), so their need to use price as an indicator 
decreases. That is, consumers using more popular keywords have stronger needs to 
develop anchors for search and to compromise. Thus, the U-shaped effect of price ranks 
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on click-through rates and the inverted U-shaped effect of price ranks on conversion rates 
should be steeper with greater keyword popularity.  
H5: Keyword popularity increases the U-shaped effect of price ranks on the click-through 
rate, making the effects steeper. 
H6: Keyword popularity increases the inverted U-shaped effect of price ranks on the 
conversion rate, making the effect steeper. 
 
1.5 Study One: Evidences from a Retail Search Engine 
1.5.1 Research Context and Data 
The data set comes from one of the world’s largest electronic shopping platforms. It 
only maintains online stores, serves more than 18 million buyers and sellers from more 
than 240 countries and regions, and showcases products in categories ranging from raw 
materials to finished goods. The platform offers certain keywords in auctions, for which 
sellers bid to earn a position on the sponsored display list of keyword search results. The 
automatic bidding process runs daily, and the content and position of the advertisements 
remains the same for that one-day period. The platform determines the position of the 
sponsored advertisements using various elements, including the cost per click (CPC), 
product relevance, and seller reliability. Its ranking algorithm ensures that products 
included in the sponsored list are relevant and comparable. The sponsored advertisements 
also are displayed alongside organic search results, and each page holds eight sponsored 
advertisements (see Appendix A for the example page). The sponsored advertisements 
disclose basic information about the products, including their name, small pictures, unit 
prices, and past sales. The displayed product prices are not affected by this bidding 
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process, so sellers can price their products regardless of their rankings or CPC. If they 
click a sponsored advertisement, consumers are directed to the product pages, which 
disclose more detailed information (e.g., multiple pictures, customer reviews, original 
and actual prices, seller information).  
I collected advertising records and responses over a one-month period (June 2017) 
of the most active 969 keywords across 91 subcategories in four industries: 100 keywords 
in home decoration and design (e.g., “decorative design”), 602 keywords in health care 
(e.g., “foot massagers”), 212 keywords in DIY tools (e.g., “ultrasonic cleaner”), and 55 
keywords in gym equipment (e.g., “yoga pad”). The 207,407 observations of sponsored 
advertisements feature 5,724 products and 189 sellers. On average, each day, a keyword 
receives 7,692 searches, 2,775 clicks, and 201 clicks that convert into purchases. 
1.5.2 Measures 
Searches, clicks, and conversions. I measured the three key response variables daily. 
Following prior literature (Jerath et al. 2014; Rutz and Bucklin 2011; Rutz et al. 2012; Yang 
and Ghose 2010), I measured search as the daily number of searches for the focal keywords, 
click as the number of clicks that the keyword advertisements received, and conversion as the 
number of purchases generated through clicks. 
Price rank and display rank. The price rank is the magnitude of the product price, 
relative to all displayed advertisements, coded with a discrete number range from 1 (lowest 
price) to 8 (highest price). A higher price ranking (smaller number) indicates that the focal 
product has a relatively lower product price. For convenience, I divide PriceRank by the total 
number of sponsored advertisements on the same pages, so the variable ranges from .125 to 
1.000. Display rank refers to the position of the advertisements, and the topmost position is 
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considered the most advantageous (Agarwal et al. 2011; Jerath et al. 2011). For this measure, 
I divided the rank of the advertisements by the total number of sponsored advertisements; it 
ranges from 0 to 1, where the topmost position has the smallest value and the bottom-most 
position has the largest value. 
Keyword specificity and popularity. Following prior literature that measures keyword 
specificity (Agarwal et al. 2011; Yang et al. 2013), I note the number of modifiers, which 
might describe a feature, version, brand name, or function. For example, “massager” has 
no modifier and thus a 0 specificity score; “Phillips feet massager” has two modifiers and 
a score of 2 on the specificity measure. For keyword popularity, I adapt Jerath et al. 
(2014)’s measure, which uses a global rank of search volume. Because this measure risks 
multicollinearity, in that popular keywords tend to be less specific, I instead assess 
keyword popularity using the local rank of search volume, conditional on keyword 
specificity. That is, for keyword i with specificity k, I measure the popularity of the focal 
keyword as its rank among keywords with same specificity, such that Popularityi = 
SearchRankik/Nk, where SearchRankik is keyword i’s rank in terms of the search volume 
among the keywords with specificity k, and Nk is the number of keywords with specificity 
k. Thus, Popularityi represents market popularity relative to other keywords with the 
same specificity. This modified approach reduces multicollinearity concerns between 
keyword specificity and popularity. In Table 2, I summarize the variables, definitions, 
and operationalizations for Study 1 and Study 2. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. 
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Study 1
1. Click The number of times that consumer clicking sponsored 
ad to view product webpage
Number of Clicks received by the advertisement per day
2. Conversion The number of purchases converted from clicks Number of Conversations received by the advertisement per 
day
3. Search The number of times that consumers search the keyword The number of searches received by the keyword per day
4. Specificity The specificity of the keywords The specificity is coded in terms of their specificity toward a 
certain category
5. Popularity The popularity of the keywords Rank of searches received by the keyword within the keyword 
with same length
6. Price Rank The relative order of displayed product price of search 
advertisements in a after-search page
PriceRank=Price ranking/number of prices in display list, ranging 
from 0.125 to 1
7. Display Rank Advertising position in a vertical listing setting Display position from 1 to 8, 1 represents topmost position
8. Ave. Sponsored Price The displayed price of sponsored search results The average displayed prices of the products appeared in the 
sponosred search results 
9. Keyword Length The length of the keyword Number of characters included in the keywords
10. Title Length The length of the title of the sponsored advertisement Number of characters included in the sponsored advetisement 
title
11. Ave. Organic Price The displayed price of organic search results The average displayed prices of the products appeared in the 
organic search results 
TABLE 2
Variables, Definitions, and Operationalizations
Definitions Operationalizations 
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12. Past Sales Units sold in the past 30 days, observable to consumers 
in click and conversion
Number of units sold in the past 30 days
13. Price The advertised unit price displayed in the sponsored 
advertisements
The advertised unit price of the product in local currency
14. Sponsored Product Number Sellers' strategic focus on the advertised products in 
searh advertising
Total number of products the seller sponsored in one day
15. Sponsored Keyword Number Sellers' strategic focus on the advertised keywords in 
searh advertising
Total number of keywords the seller sponsored in one day
16. Review Number The popularity of the sellers, observed by consumers 
reviews toward the focal seller
Number of customer reviews for the advertised products
17. Brand Whether the keyword involves certain brand names Dummy variable, Brand=1 indicating the keyword include a brand 
name and Brand=0 otherwise
18. Discount Rate The extent of promotion, observed by consumers in 
conversion stage
Discount Rate=1-Sale Price/Original Price
Study 2
1. Click The click decisions of participants on the sponsored 
advertisements
Dummy variable, click=1 indicating the advertisement is clicked 
at focal click, and 0 otherwise
2. Conversion The purchase decisions of participants on the sponsored 
advertisements
Dummy variable, conversion=1 indicating the advertisement is 
purchased, and 0 otherwise
3. Rank (from 1 to 7) The relative order of displayed product price of search 
advertisements among the 7 advertisements
Measured as a categorical variable with the lowest priced as 1 
and highest as 7
4. Stream The sequence of clicks along the participant's search 
process
Normalized to one with the first click as 0, and the last click 
prior purchase is 1
5. Design Participants' interests toward the design of the product 
regardless of product price
Measured by a 7-point scale with “not interested/ extremely 
interested”
6. PreClick Participants' interests toward the design of the product 
regardless of product price
Dummy variable, PreClick=1 indicating the advertisement has 
been clicked prior the focal click, and 0 otherwise
TABLE 2 (Cont')
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Variables Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. Click 282.59 859.99 0.00 28299.00 1.00
2. Conversion 20.46 143.34 0.00 7129.00 0.52 1.00
3. Search 7645.83 14089.93 3.00 320940.00 0.57 0.11 1.00
4. Specificity 1.18 0.67 0.00 3.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.13 1.00
5. Popularity 0.48 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.09 0.40 -0.04 1.00
6. Price Rank 0.53 0.29 0.13 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00
7. Display Rank 0.50 0.34 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.00
8. Ave. Sponsored Price 1312.86 2390.34 1.05 25015.85 0.16 0.02 0.13 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.00 1.00
9. Keyword Length 5.29 1.53 2.00 11.00 0.00 0.03 -0.10 0.79 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00
10. Title Length 28.41 2.22 1.00 30.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 1.00
11. Ave. Organic Price 897.69 2259.17 0.00 50000.00 0.10 0.00 0.09 -0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.44 -0.05 0.00 1.00
12. Past Sales 860.55 2836.87 0.00 21235.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.15 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.19 -0.05 1.00
13. Price 1312.86 3607.62 0.50 179900.00 0.13 0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.25 0.02 0.66 0.00 -0.09 0.29 -0.08 1.00
14. Sponsored Product Number 117.17 125.47 4.00 680.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.16 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.12 1.00
15. Sponsored Keyword Number 27.00 26.91 1.00 186.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.15 0.13 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.30 1.00
16. Review Number 6530.50 23238.10 0.00 221136.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.16 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.18 -0.05 0.75 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 1.00
17. Brand 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.13 -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 1.00
18. Discount Rate 0.48 0.27 0.00 0.99 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.19 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.29 -0.04 0.22 -0.09 -0.08 0.10 0.24 0.01 1.00
Study 1: Descriptive Statistics
TABLE 3
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1.5.3 Model Specification 
I cast our simultaneous model in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. Assume that for 
keyword i at time t, the sponsored advertising display of advertisement j receives nijt clicks 
and mijt conversions out of Nijt searches, where 0 ≤ nijt ≤ Nijt. Furthermore, among the nijt clicks, 
there are mijt conversions, such that mijt ≤ nijt. I define the probability of a click as pijt and the 
probability of a conversion as qijt, conditional on nijt > 0. In our model, the consumer faces 
two decisions, click and conversion, that lead to three outcomes. First, a consumer might click 
the keyword advertisement and make a purchase (pijtqijt). Second, a consumer can click the 
keyword advertisement but not make a purchase (pijt (1 – qijt)). Third, a consumer can choose 
not to click (1 – pijt). These decisions depend on differences in individual keywords, both 
observed and unobserved, and the observed characteristics of the seller and the product. The 
probability of observing (nijt, mijt) is given by 
(1)  
Consumers’ decisions to click. The click rates a sponsored advertisement receives 
vary across keywords, according to the corresponding audience (Jerath et al. 2014; Rutz 
and Bucklin 2011) and the rank of search advertisements (Rutz et al. 2012; Yang and 
Ghose 2010). Therefore, I model the click-through rate as a function of observed 
heterogeneities Specificity, Popularity, and DisplayRank; a vector Xijt containing 
observed covariances; and unobserved keyword-level, seller-level, and time-level 
heterogeneities. The probability of click pijt by the latent consumer utility function  
is given as: 
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(2) , and 
(3) = α0i + α1i PriceRankijt + α2iPriceRank2ijt + α3Specificityi + α4Popularityi + 
α5DisplayRankijt + α6-15Xijt + + ηijt. 
To capture unobserved seller-level and time-level heterogeneities, I include two random 
effects:  is the random effect for time t, and  is the random effect for a seller of 
advertisement j. In turn, Xijt is a vector of observed covariances, including the average 
sponsored prices of keyword i at time t, the length of keyword i, a dummy variable indicating 
whether the keyword i contains certain brand names, the length of advertisement j’s title at 
time t, cumulative past sales of the advertised product j at time t, the price of the product j at 
time t, the number of keywords that advertisement j’s seller sponsored at time t, and the 
number of products that advertisement j’s seller sponsored at time t. To capture keyword-level 
heterogeneity, I use random coefficients for the intercept and PriceRank. The random 
coefficients are modeled as: 
(4)      
(5) .        
Consumers’ decisions to convert. Keyword advertising literature suggests that 
conversion rates vary across keywords (Specificity and Popularity) and positions 
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(DisplayRank) (Rutz et al. 2012; Yang and Ghose 2010). In addition, review volume 
provides a quality signal that influences consumers’ purchase decisions (Chevalier and 
Mayzlin 2006; Zhu and Zhang 2010). In our research context, review volume and 
discount rate can be observed only on the product page, so they are exogenous to click 
decisions. Furthermore, it takes some time for products to be delivered, so review volume 
can be considered predetermined. Thus, I model the conversion rate as a function of 
Specificity, Popularity, Display Rank, Xijt, ReviewVolume, DiscountRate, and random 
effects at the keyword-, seller-, and time-levels. The probability of conversion qijt 
determined by the latent consumer utility function  is given as: 
(6) , and 
(7)  = β0i + β1iPriceRankijt + β2iPriceRank2ijt + β3Specificityi + β4Popularityi + 
β5DisplayRankijt + β6Reviewijt + β7DiscountRatejt + β8-17Xijt + + εijt. 
To capture unobserved heterogeneity in terms of time and the seller, I include two 
random effects:  is the random effect for time t, and  is the random effect for a 
seller of advertisement j. I again capture unobserved heterogeneity with a random coefficient, 
specified on both the intercept and the PriceRank, as follows:   
(8) , and    
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(9)  .       
Advertiser’s decision on price rank. Next, I model the advertiser’s strategic price 
rank decision. Advertisers adjust their strategy to obtain competitive advantages, so I 
expect that sellers determine their pricing strategy on the basis of their expectations about 
competitors’ pricing strategies, their own previous advertising performance (i.e., click-
through and conversion rates), and their current product status (i.e., review volume). The 
advertisement’s position is not determined by product prices and discounts, so I also 
expect advertisers to adjust the advertised prices according to the current display rank. 
Thus, I model PriceRank as a function of DisplayRank, Review, DiscountRate, and Xijt; 
the lagged click-through rate (pijt-1), conversion rate (qijt-1), and price rank of the same 
keyword (PriceRankijt-1); and the random effects for time t ( ) and for seller j 
( ). Then PriceRankijt is modeled as: 
(10) PriceRankijt = ψ0+ ψ1PriceRankijt-1+ ψ2Specificityi + ψ3Popularityi +ψ4Reviewijt 
+ψ5DisplayRankijt +ψ6DiscountRatejt + ψ7pijt-1+ ψ8qijt-1 +ψ9-18Xijt 
+ +vijt. 
Advertiser’s decision on display rank. Finally, sellers observe prior advertising 
performance, achieved through their previous bidding activity, and seek an optimal 
advertising position. The platform also considers the advertiser’s previous click-through 
rate and product popularity to determine bidding results. Thus, I use the lagged click-
through rate pijt-1, conversion rate qijt-1, and advertising position DisplayRankijt-1; Reviews, 
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DiscountRate, and keyword characteristics (i.e., Specificity and Popularity); and the 
random effects  for time t and for seller j when I model DisplayRank.  
(11) DisplayRankijt =φ0 + φ1DisplayRankijt-1 + φ2Specificityi + φ3Popularityi + φ4Reviewijt 
+ φ5DiscountRatejt + φ6pijt-1+ φ7qijt-1 + φ8-17Xijt + + uijt. 
Finally, to model unobserved covariances, I let the four error terms correlate as 
follows: 
(12) .     
1.5.4 Identification 
To identify endogeneity and the proposed system of the simultaneous equation 
model, I provide a sketch of the model, which boils down to the following simultaneous 
equations: 
(13) , 
(14) ,  
(15) , and 
(16)  
where , , , and  are exogenous variables from the four equations. 
The error terms ( , , , and ) capture information observed by decision 
makers (consumers, sellers, and the platform) but not researchers. The endogeneity of 
PriceRank and DisplayRank can be identified by correlation among the error terms, such 
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that PriceRank is endogenous if  correlates with  or , and DisplayRank is 
endogenous if  correlates with , , or .  
A triangulation system can be identified too, by modeling DisplayRank as 
exogenously determined by the advertiser’s past performance with the same keyword, 
other keyword-related characteristics, and a latent instrumental variable. Given 
DisplayRank and the advertiser’s past performance with the same keyword, advertisers 
determine their pricing strategy, which determines the effects of the advertisements’ 
PriceRank. Finally, PriceRank and DisplayRank affect both click-through and conversion 
probabilities. 
1.5.5 Estimation Results 
To ensure the model is empirically identified, I pretest it with a simulated data set. I 
randomly generated a set of parameters to be estimated, then calculated the clicks and 
conversions using a sample from the data set and the proposed distributions. When I 
estimated the proposed model with the simulated data, I were able to recover the true 
parameter values. This result mitigates concerns about the empirical identification of the 
proposed model. 
I adopt a Bayesian approach and use the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
method to estimate our proposed model. I draw samples from the posterior distribution of 
40,000 iterations following a burn-in of 40,000 iterations and save every 40th draw to 
avoid potential autocorrelations (see Appendix B for details of the MCMC algorithm and 
Appendix C for the MCMC diagnosis). To avoid the influences of first-page biases 
(Agarwal et al. 2011) and the incomparability of the sponsored advertisements in later 
pages, I used samples containing only advertisements displayed in the first page of search 
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results (i.e., top 8 positions). Table 4 presents the results of our main effects tests 
regarding the influences of price ranks and keyword attributes on click-through and 
conversion rates. In addition, I report the estimated, unobserved, keyword-level 
heterogeneities and estimated variance–covariance matrix in table 5 and 6. Price rank has 
a U-shaped effect on the click-through rates, such that the first-order term has a negative 
effect (  = -1.483, p < .01), but the second-order term has a positive effect ( = 1.319, p 
< .01). Advertisements that feature product prices that are relatively high or low receive 
more clicks from keyword searches, in support of H1. In addition, price rank has a 
positive first-order effect (  = .824, p < .01) and a negative second-order effect ( = -
.760, p < .01) on conversion rates, in support of H2.  
Table 4 also reveals moderating effects of keyword specificity and popularity. For click-
through rates, the U-shaped effect of price ranks is weakened by keyword specificity (α11 
=.979, p < .01 first-order interaction; α21 = -.921, p < .01 second-order interaction) and 
enhanced by keyword popularity (α12 = -.724, p < .01 first-order interaction; α22 = .610, p 
< .01 second-order interaction), in support of H3 and H5. For conversion rates, the inverted U-
shaped effect is enhanced by keyword popularity (β12 = .390, p < .01 first-order interaction; 
β22 = -.434, p < .01 second-order interaction) but weakened by keyword specificity (β11 = -
.563, p < .01 first-order interaction; β21 = .524, p < .01 second-order interaction), in support 
of H4 and H6. 
Figure 1 further illustrates the effects of the price ranks on click-through and 
conversion rates, along with the moderating effects of keyword specificity and popularity. 
The high and low values of specificity and popularity are one standard deviation above 
and below the means, respectively. As illustrated, when the price rank moves from 
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extreme to moderate values, the click-through rate decreases by around 21.03% (i.e., 
from 5.08% to 4.01%), and the conversion rate increases by 15.05% (i.e., from 1.43% to 
1.65%). 
Keyword specificity weakens consumers’ tendency to click extreme-priced displays 
(Figure 1, Panel A) and thus minimizes the differences between moderate and extreme 
prices, such that the click-through rate decreases by 33.09% (from 5.31% to 3.55%) for 
low specificity keywords and by 6.89% (from 4.86% to 4.52%) for high specificity 
keywords as the price rank moves from extreme to moderate values. Keyword popularity 
expands the differences between extremely priced alternatives  and moderately priced 
alternatives though (Figure 1, Panel B), such that the click-through rate decreases by 
11.90% (from 5.06% to 4.46%) for low popularity keywords and by 29.26% (from 5.10% 
to 3.60%) for high popularity keywords when the price rank of the target product moves 
from the extremes to a moderate position. 
For conversion rates, keyword specificity weakens (Figure 1, Panel C) but keyword 
popularity enhances (Figure 1, Panel D) the advantages of the moderately priced displays. 
As the price rank moves to the middle, the conversion rate increases by 4.45% (from 
1.57% to 1.64%) if keyword specificity is high and by 26.73% (from 1.31% to 1.66%) if 
keyword specificity is low. In addition, the conversion rate increases by 24.50% (from 
1.28% to 1.60%) when keyword popularity is high and by 6.15% (from 1.60% to 1.70%) 
when keyword popularity is low as the price rank moves from the extremes to the middle.
35 
 
Dependent Variable Conversion Rate Price Rank Display Rank
Main Effects
Price Rank -1.483(.079) .824(.122)
Price Rank
2 1.319(.067) -.760(.101)
Moderating Effects 
Price Rank × Specificity .979(.056) -.563(.105)
Price Rank
2
 × Specificity -.921(.055) .524(.096)
Price Rank × Popularity -.724(.059) .390(.112)
Price Rank
2
 × Popularity .610(.057) -.434(.102)
Control Variables 
Specificity -.467(.035) .332(.069) -.001(.001) -.004(.001)
Popularity .324(.034) -.271(.067) .000(.001) .000(.001)
Ave. Sponsored Price -.033(.006) .049(.010) .003(.003) .003(.003)
Keyword Length .100(.025) .144(.034) -.001(.001) .004(.001)
Brand .006(.051) -.022(.071) -.005(.002) -.001(.003)
Title Length .027(.007) .060(.011) -.003(.003) .004(.003)
Ave. Organic Price .013(.005) .026(.009) -.015(.001) -.001(.001)
Display Rank -1.119(.044) -.763(.054) -.008(.010)
Past Sales .060(.012) .099(.023) .002(.004) -.033(.005)
Product Price .041(.007) -.096(.013) .041(.001) .000(.001)
Product Number -.027(.012) -.028(.016) -.001(.008) -.022(.010)
Keyword Number .011(.006) .042(.009) .005(.001) -.033(.002)
Review Volume .052(.022) .002(.012) .005(.022)
Discount Rate .077(.010) .004(.007) -.006(.012)
Price Rankt-1 .133(.002)
Click Ratet-1 -.008(.013) -.119(.019)
Conversion Ratet-1 .018(.011) .057(.016)
Review Volumet-1 .012(.001) .010(.001)
Display Rankt-1 .151(.002)
Intercept -2.281(.070) -4.586(.245) .458(.027) -1.861(.052)
DIC
Click-through Rate
229696.653
Note : In table 4-7, 1) Specificity and Popularity are mean-centered; 2) Posterior means and posterior standard deviations (in
parentheses) are reported, and estimates that are significant at 95% are bolded.
TABLE 4
Estimated Results
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α0i (Intercept) α1i (Pricerank) α 2i (Pricerank
2
)
α0i (Intercept) 1.340(.121) -1.373(.117) -.587(.065)
α1i (Pricerank) -1.373(.117) 1.490(.117) .571(.063)
α 2i (Pricerank
2
) -.587(.065) .571(.063) .474(.040)
β 0i (Intercept) β1i (Pricerank) β 2i (Pricerank
2
)
β 0i (Intercept) 2.750(.296) -2.568(.272) -1.577(.176)
β 1i (Pricerank) -2.568(.272) 2.487(.256) 1.493(.162)
β 2i (Pricerank
2
) -1.577(.176) 1.493(.162) 1.242(.115)
TABLE 5
Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates (S
α
)
Study 1: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates
Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates (S
β
)
η ijk (Click) ε ijk (Conversion) v ijt (Pricerank) μ ijt (DisplayRank)
η ijk (Click) .752(.004) .526(.006) -.003(.001) .016(.004)
ε ijk (Conversion) .526(.006) 1.331(.012) -.007(.002) .014(.004)
φ ijt (Pricerank) -.003(.001) -.007(.002) .036(.000) .002(.001)
μ ijt (DisplayRank) .016(.004) .014(.004) .002(.001) .079(.000)
TABLE 6
Study 1: Estimated Variance and Covariance Matrix
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FIGURE 1
The Effects of Price Ranks
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1.5.6 Post Hoc Analysis: Economic Values of Price Ranks 
I derive implications for the economic performance of each price rank by applying 
the estimated model. Specifically, I calculate, counterfactually, the number of clicks, 
number of conversions, and profitability of each price rank across different types of 
keywords. I divide the keywords into four categories: niche general, niche specific, 
popular general, and popular specific, such that niche or popular reflects the level of 
keyword popularity, and general or specific indicates the level of keyword specificity.  
First, the first column of Table 7 illustrates the number of clicks received by the 
advertisements per day, given the price ranks. The results suggest that optimal price rank 
for gathering clicks are extreme prices, either low or high, for popular general keywords, 
popular specific keywords and niche general keywords; while consumers have a neutral 
preference toward products of all price ranks when they search for  niche specific 
keywords. For niche specific keywords, the intermediately priced alternative receives the 
most clicks, though the gap is trivial. 
Second, optimal price rank for conversions are high or low ones. Second column of 
Table 7 illustrates conversions received by advertisements per day across price ranks. 
The lowest priced alternative receives the most conversions for popular general keywords 
and popular specific keywords. While the highest priced alternative receives the most 
conversions for niche general keywords and niche specific keywords, although the 
differences are smaller.  
To investigate the profitability of each price rank, I used profitable Cost-per-Click 
(Profitable CPC). Profitable CPC measures the highest Cost-per-Click that the advertiser 
can pay if its profit from each conversion is $1 
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( ). A higher Profitable CPC indicates the 
better profitability of the advertisement. Column 3 of Table 5 shows that intermediate 
priced alternatives offer the highest Profitable CPC for niche general keywords, popular 
general, and popular specific keywords. For niche specific keywords alone, the optimal 
price rank is the highest priced alternative. 
Overall, these analyses show that in order to generate consumer interests reflected in 
clicks and total transactions reflected in conversions, being high and/or low-price rank 
helps, while being intermediate price rank generates the highest dollar return of 
investment. These patterns are particularly strong for general and/or popular keywords.  
(1) (2) (3)
Price rank Clicks Conversions Profitable CPC
Low 189.075 2.726 $0.014
Median 146.980 2.523 $0.017
High 204.689 3.057 $0.015
Low 160.462 2.698 $0.017
Median 165.364 2.791 $0.017
High 158.009 2.880 $0.018
Low 684.669 8.594 $0.013
Median 413.747 6.671 $0.016
High 696.251 7.638 $0.011
Low 442.681 6.482 $0.015
Median 355.388 5.635 $0.016
High 409.365 5.486 $0.013
TABLE 7
Study 1: Post-Hoc Analysis
Notes. Profitable CPC represents the highest Cost-per-Click the advertiser
should pay if the profit per conversion is $1.
Niche general keywords
Niche specific keywords
Popular general keywords
Popular specific keywords
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1.5.7 Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our estimation results, I conducted additional tests and 
the results are reported in Table 8. 
Model specifications. I use fixed effects for keywords, sellers, and time instead of 
the current model specification. I find no significant differences in the estimation results.  
Alternative predictors. A potential concern about the price rank measure is that the 
distances across the prices of the different products are not evident. Therefore, I divide 
the price range in the display list into five intervals and use the price interval as an 
alternative measure. In addition to price interval, I consider the relative price of the 
advertised products within the keyword search results as a predictor. The relative price of 
the product i within the keyword j’s search is the standardized (adjusted by mean and 
variance) product price. The results are consistent with our main estimation results, and I 
keep the current predictor for better model fit.  
Sponsored advertisements in all pages. For our main analysis, the sample consists 
only of advertisements on the first display pages, to rule out first-page biases (Agarwal et 
al. 2011) and incomparability issues. To determine if advertisements on later pages also 
are affected by price information, I run the proposed model with a sample containing all 
observations. The estimated results are consistent.  
Latent instrumental variable. Another potential concern is the endogenous nature 
of the decision variables. Rutz et al. (2012) suggest latent instrumental variables might 
address potential endogeneity issues, so to verify the validity of our model identification, 
I adopt this approach (Ebbes et al. 2005) and reestimate the model. Testing for two–five 
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latent categories, I determine that the model with two latent categories provides the best 
fit. The results are consistent with the main model. 
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Dependent Variable Click-through Rate Conversion Rate Click-through Rate Conversion Rate
Interval -.552(.095) .341(.147) Relative Price -.055(.014) .077(.028)
Interval
2 .471(.069) -.325(.102) Relative Price
2 .067(.004) -.084(.028)
Interval × Specificity .433(.078) -.517(.098) Relative Price × Specificity .043(.005) -.032(.017)
Interval
2
 × Specificity -.444(.062) .443(.076) Relative Price
2
 × Specificity -.043(.004) .028(.009)
Interval × Popularity -.390(.069) .299(.092) Relative Price × Popularity -.024(.006) .030(.015)
Interval
2
 × Popularity .351(.057) -.303(.080) Relative Price
2
 × Popularity .036(.004) -.027(.016)
DIC DIC
Dependent Variable Click-through Rate Conversion Rate Click-through Rate Conversion Rate
Price Rank -1.379(.188) 1.064(.263) Price Rank -1.355(.079) 1.219(.207)
Price Rank
2 1.258(.175) -.941(.188) Price Rank
2 1.286(.067) -1.184(.144)
Price Rank × Specificity .659(.074) -.901(.185) Price Rank × Specificity .953(.044) -.819(.116)
Price Rank
2
 × Specificity -.669(.068) .829(.172) Price Rank
2
 × Specificity -.896(.044) .767(.108)
Price Rank × Popularity -.500(.079) .370(.122) Price Rank × Popularity -.705(.064) .450(.115)
Price Rank
2
 × Popularity .470(.072) -.439(.111) Price Rank
2
 × Popularity .593(.063) -.503(.114)
DIC DIC
Panel B: Relative Price
TABLE 8
Panel A: Price Interval
Note : 1. Specificity and Popularity are mean-centered; 2. Posterior means and posterior standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported, and estimates that are significant at 95% are
bolded.
Study 1: Robustness Checks
1578069.181
Panel C: Sample with All Advertisements
1267104.717
Panel D: Latent Instrumental Variable
415976.997
2152363.921
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1.5.8 Summary and Discussion 
I reveal asymmetric effects of price rank on click-through and conversion rates, such 
that consumers generally prefer extremely priced options for clicks, yet this extreme 
preference diminishes among consumers searching with more specific keywords and 
increases among those searching with more popular keywords. In contrast, the clicks of 
moderately priced options are more likely to convert into purchases, and the avoidance of 
extremes is especially notable for more popular keywords and weaker for more specific 
keywords. The post hoc analysis suggests that the price rank that optimizes advertising 
performance depends on the type of keywords searched; counterfactual analyses suggest 
that extreme prices provide the most clicks and conversions, but intermediate prices 
maximize the profitability of the sponsored advertisements, at least for niche general, 
popular general, and popular specific keywords.  
 
1.6 Study Two: Evidences from an Experiment 
The objectives of Study 2 are twofold. First, I seek to add confidence to the findings 
of Study 1 by addressing potential endogeneity concerns due to selection bias and 
omitted variables. Second, I use simulated clickstream data to investigate the underlying 
mechanisms.   
1.6.1 Method 
Participants and design. Three hundred ten respondents gathered from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (34.00 years on average, 34.84% women) were recruited and randomly 
assigned to either search only or search and buy experimental condition. In the search 
only condition, participants had to evaluate seven search advertisements and predict the 
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price of a new product based on the information contained in those advertisements. In the 
search and buy condition, participants evaluated seven search advertisements and chose 
the product they would purchase. To guarantee their involvement, the participants read 
that their monetary rewards would be based on their task performance. The main 
dependent measures were click and conversion (purchase) behaviors (see Appendix D for 
details). 
Procedure. The experimental webpage featured seven search advertisements that 
stemmed from a search for the keyword “cat stand.” All seven advertisements were 
created to mimic actual search advertisements listed on Amazon.com. The seven 
advertised products featured prices ranging from $25.80 to $94.98, and the 
advertisements also provided basic information, such as a picture, review volume, and 
review ratings (see Appendix E for details). To avoid position effects, the sequence of the 
seven advertisements changed randomly for each participant. The review volume and 
ratings also were the same across the seven advertisements, to rule out potential review 
influences.  
Participants could click any of the seven advertisements, which led them to a 
detailed product page. From this page, the participants in both conditions could choose to 
“return to the main page” or “buy this product” (only in buy condition). Clicking the 
“return” link put participants back on the original webpage displaying the seven search 
advertisements. There is no number limit of advertisements they can click. Clicking the 
“buy this product” button indicated a decision (completed search), so participants who 
clicked it left the website. Finally, participants completed questions measuring 
covariances and demographic questions.  
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1.6.2 Measurement and Model 
Measures. The dependent variables are participants’ clickstreams and purchase 
decisions. For participants in the search-and-buy condition, the clicks are captured by the 
subjects’ clicking behaviors prior their final purchase, where the conversions are captured 
by the subjects’ last click. For participants in the search-only condition, all the clicking 
behaviors are counted as clicks. For participants in the search-and-buy condition, the 
clicks are captured by the subjects’ clicking behaviors prior their final purchase, where 
the conversions are captured by the subjects’ last click. For participants in the search-only 
condition, all the clicking behaviors are counted as clicks. 
To calculate the search phase, I relied on the sequence of clicks in the clickstream 
Streamij, or click sequence j divided by consumer i's total number of clicks Ni 
( , j = 1, …, Ni), ranging from 0 to 1. Therefore, Streamij = 0 if consumer 
i's jth click is the first one, and Streamij = 1 if it is the last click prior conversion, which 
marks a purchase decision in the buy condition and the end of the search in the search 
condition. 
Model. I use a consumer utility function and multinomial choice model to estimate 
the clicks and conversions.  Among the seven alternatives, participants choose the one 
with the highest utility, given their search orientations, search phase, and other 
covariances such as Designik indicates consumer i's interest in the design of product k, 
measured as the designs of the advertised products as “not interested/extremely 
interested”, and PreClickijk indicates whether product k has been clicked by consumer i 
prior to the jth click. Among Ni clicks by consumer i, the probability that the jth click is 
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on a product with price rank k (Pijk), according to the latent consumer utility function Uijk, 
is: 
(17) , where q=1, 2,…., 7, and  
(18) , 
The conversion model with a similar framework is specified as  
(19) , 
where Streamij represents the phases of jth click along consumer i's clickstream ranging 
from 0 to 1. Then ,  and  refer to the parameters specific to product k, such that 
 captures the variations of probability that product k appears in the first click, 
 captures the variations of probability that product k appears in the last click, 
and  captures the variations of probability that product k was finally purchased, all 
relative to the baseline. 
1.6.3 Results 
Figure 2 summarizes the average clicks and conversions per participants among the 
alternatives across price ranks. The multinomial choice model, estimated with maximum 
likelihood, produces the estimation results in Table 9, for which the second cheapest 
product (rank 2) serves as the reference. Extremely priced alternatives are more likely to 
be clicked at the beginning of the search process. Among participants in the search-and-
buy condition (column 2, Table 9), products with extreme prices (  = 1.068, p < .01; 
= 1.061, p < .01) receive more clicks than products with intermediate prices ( = -
.740, p < .05; = -1.635, p < .01; = -1.117, p < .01). Similarly, participants in the 
search-only condition (column 4, Table 9) tend to click more on the extremes ( = 1.007, 
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p < .01; = .912, p < .01) rather than moderate alternatives ( = -.885, p < .10; = -
.848, p < .10; = -.414, p > .10). 
FIGURE 2
Summary of Clicks and Conversions
Notes. The upper panel displays the average clicks per subject for all participants, and the
lower panel displays the average purchases per subject for participants in the search-and-buy
and buy-only conditions.
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In contrast, participants’ preferences toward products with extreme prices decrease 
when they approach the end of their clickstreams, such that Stream positively affects the 
click probability of moderately priced products for participants in search-and-buy ( = 
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1.540, p < .05; = 1.558, p < .01) but not search-only condition ( = .339, p > .10; 
= .115, p > .10; = -.147, p > .10) conditions. In addition, Stream negatively affects 
the click probability for extremely priced products in both groups (search-and-buy = -
.826, p < .10; = -.980, p < .05; search-only = -.925, p < .10; = -.834, p < .10).  
The estimated results for conversion model (column 5, Table 9) suggests that 
participants prefer intermediately priced alternatives ( =.946, p < .01; = 1.260, p 
< .01; = .858, p < .01) over extremely priced ones ( = -1.195, p < .05; = -.555, 
p > .10; = -.881, p < .05).  
Panel A and B of Figure 3 depict the dynamics in the click model. At the beginning 
of the clickstream, consumers concentrate on the extremes. As they progress, participants 
in the search-and-buy condition (Panel A) gradually shift their attention away from the 
extremes and they become more neutral at the end of the search phases. In contrast, 
participants in the search-only condition (Panel B) hold consistent preference toward 
products with extreme prices, although their extreme preferences weaken at the end of the 
search phases. Panel C of Figure 3 illustrate the estimated results for conversion model. 
For participants they show a strong preference toward products with intermediate price.  
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Conversions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main Full Main Full
Rank1 (ρ01) .713(.167)*** 1.068(.257)*** .567(.183)*** 1.007(.304)*** -1.195(.509)**
Rank3 (ρ02) -.425(.185)*** -.740(.351)** -.666(.210)*** -.885(.436)* .946(.278)***
Rank4 (ρ04) -.564(.190)*** -1.635(.438)*** -.775(.216)*** -.848(.437)* 1.260(.269)***
Rank5 (ρ05) -.202(.176) -1.117(.369)*** -.505(.203)** -.414(.388) .858(.282)***
Rank6 (ρ06) .196(.169) -.109(.299) .178(.185) .390(.327) -.555(.396)
Rank7 (ρ07) .666(.166)*** 1.061(.256)*** .517(.180)*** .912(.304)*** -.881(.447)**
Stream (ρ11) -.826(.451)* -.925(.475)*
Stream (ρ13) .494(.535) .339(.604)
Stream (ρ14) 1.540(.609)** .115(.610)
Stream (ρ15) 1.558(.532)*** -.147(.566)
Stream (ρ16) .644(.469) -.395(.498)
Stream (ρ17) -.980(.458)** -.834(.482)*
Design (ρ2) .000(.027) -.002(.028) -.005(.031) -.009(.031) -.023(.045)
PreClick (ρ3) -1.837(.161) -1.719(.161)*** -1.715(.180)*** -1.589(.181)*** -.596(.234)
R
2
.082 .114 .082 .079 .011
DIC -922.829 -860.592 -713.183 -708.472 -315.391
Sample size 132
Study 2: Estimated Results for Click-Throughs and Converions
TABLE 9
Notes. Rank 2 is used as baseline. Subjects of buy condition with at least 4 clicks are categorized in the search and buy group; Stage=0
for the first click; stage=1 for the last click (equals purchase for the buy task)
* p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
132 103
Search-and-buy Search-only
Clicks
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FIGURE 3
Study 2: Estimated Results of Consumer Choices
Panel A: Decision funnel for participants in search-and-buy condition
Panel B: Decision funnel for participants in search-only condition
Panel C: Estimated results for conversions
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1.6.4 Summary and Discussion 
The results of Study 2 add confidence to the empirical findings from Study 1, by verifying 
the mechanisms underlying within-consumer variations of click behaviors across different 
consumer groups. In particular, the results show that for search-only consumers, in early-stage 
search, they tend to click extremely priced options for developing anchors, and such pattern 
persists but weakens in late-stage search. This is consistent with our premise that anchoring is 
particularly relevant in early stage of the search process when consumers do not have enough 
information.  
For search and buy consumers, when consumer preferences are ambiguous in early stage of 
the information search, preferences evolve through an anchoring-and-adjustment process 
(Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989; Hoch and Deighton 1989). In particular, early-stage consumers 
evaluate extremely priced alternatives to use as anchors. With this information gained from 
clicking on the extremes, consumers move toward the decision end of the purchase funnel, where 
they seek to evaluate a few plausible alternatives and make decisions. To do so, they find 
compromise options and limit their consideration set to a few moderately priced alternatives. 
Thus, as consumers move from the opening to the end of the purchase funnel, their focus shifts 
from extremely priced to moderately priced alternatives. The variations across decision phases 
cause consumers to display different preferences in terms of clicks and conversions. 
 
1.7 General Discussion 
Search advertising is a massive source of revenue for search engines and a vast advertising 
platform for online sellers. I consider how the advertised product price might determine the ways 
that consumers assess alternative options. Although advertising positions alone are critical for 
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drawing consumers’ attention, I also show that firms must set the prices of their products 
strategically, then select appropriate sponsored keywords according to their strategic goals. The 
price rank has a U-shaped effect on click-through rates and an inverted U-shaped effect on 
conversion rates. Furthermore, keyword specificity weakens the effect of price ranks, whereas 
keyword popularity enhances their effects, on both click-through rates and conversion rates. The 
analysis of clickstream data in Study 2 confirms that the click and conversion patterns from 
Study 1. 
1.7.1 Theoretical Implications 
To broaden extant understanding of search advertising, I introduce product price as a strong 
determinant of the effectiveness of sponsored keyword advertisements. In particular, I shed new 
light on the unique determinants of clicks and conversions (Agarwal et al. 2011; Ghose and Yang 
2009; Rutz and Bucklin 2011). Clicks, as a means to search for generic information, tend to 
center on extremely priced options, particularly in the early stages of the purchase funnel. The 
extremely priced options, once clicked, serve as anchors for subsequent preferences and 
assessments of other alternatives. In contrast, conversion, as a form of deeper engagement, is 
more likely for moderately priced options that support feasible trade-off decisions in the late 
stages of purchase funnel.  
These changes in consumer focus contribute to further variations. Over the course of a 
complete search–purchase process, consumers tend to click the extremes at first, then shift to 
intermediate values as they get close to a decision. Heterogeneity among consumers also 
contributes, such that search-oriented consumers might leave the purchase funnel after a few 
clicks on the extremes, because they have obtained the general information they needed. 
Purchase-oriented consumers, depending on their prior knowledge and needs, might enter the 
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purchase funnel midway through and focus only on intermediate values, or else go through the 
purchase funnel from start to end but sequentially adjust their focus from extreme to intermediate 
values. 
These findings contribute to pricing literature, which highlights the dynamics of two 
contrasting effects of pricing tactics, namely, the anchoring effect (Epley and Gilovich 2006; 
Krishna et al. 2006) and the compromise effect (Chernev 2004; Dhar et al. 2000; Kivetz et al. 
2004b). I reconcile these two views by distinguishing their relevance for different stages along 
the purchase funnel. The anchoring effect of extreme priced options works better to explain 
clicks that seek exploratory information in early stages; the compromise effect offers a clearer 
explanation of conversions, which represent late stages closer to purchase decisions.  
Keyword attributes, such as specificity and popularity, influence consumers’ click and 
purchase decisions (Agarwal et al. 2011; Jerath et al. 2014; Narayanan and Kalyanam 2015); I 
extend prior insights to show that they also function as boundary conditions that shape the effect 
of price ranks on consumers’ responses to sponsored keyword advertising. The attributes also 
signal different market segments. Specifically, the use of specific keywords implies that 
consumers have well-developed preferences and background knowledge; popular keywords 
instead imply a large segment, such as a mass market. The moderating effects of keyword 
specificity and popularity highlight how these two attributes can differentiate consumers’ 
responses (i.e., clicks or conversions) to relative price information in sponsored advertisement 
lists. In turn, the need for anchors versus compromise differs across segments, as inferred from 
keyword attributes. Advertisements sponsoring more specific keywords are less likely to be 
affected by price comparisons, so the anchoring and compromise effects of the price rank 
diminish. In contrast, more popular keywords attract more competitors and more alternative 
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options for a larger segment, with greater needs for both anchors and compromises. The 
empirical results highlight the distinct natures of these two moderators: Specific keywords 
indicate consumers who are more engaged and extreme-averse; popular keywords reflect 
competition in the choice set and increase consumers’ need for market signals, such as those 
available from product prices.  
1.7.2 Managerial Implications  
Firms set budgets to sponsor a few keywords out of the millions available. Identifying the 
most effective set, given budget constraints, is challenging, especially considering the 
complicated nature of sponsored keyword advertising. Firms normally participate in keyword 
search advertising repeatedly and need to adjust their offers to improve their results. In 
interviews with sellers on online shopping websites, I find that they intentionally adjust their 
sponsored product prices (e.g., doorbuster price, premium price) to attract clicks or conversions. 
They closely track search advertising by their competitors and adjust their own strategies 
accordingly. In these efforts to improve their search advertising, sellers could integrate the 
results of our study to inform how they adjust prices of products presented in search results. 
In particular, managers must acknowledge the nuanced effects of information displayed in 
sponsored advertisements, especially price information. I highlight discrepancies between clicks 
and conversions associated with price rank; more clicks driven by price rank do not necessarily 
lead to more conversions (i.e., sales). Instead, managers should develop differentiated strategies, 
depending on their objectives in terms of attracting either exploratory consumers and 
maximizing their exposures or consumers close to a purchase decision and maximizing 
advertising profitability. In the former case, managers should use an extreme price, so that the 
products achieve high or low positions in the price ranks. In the latter case though, managers 
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should adopt a moderate pricing tactic to help consumers trade off between price and quality and 
identify products with the highest overall value. 
Furthermore, managers should leverage keyword attributes as segmentation tools. By 
considering keyword specificity and popularity, they can strategically set the prices of their 
products, relative to those of competitors that also appear in the keyword search results. The 
results of our post hoc analysis across four combinations of keyword specificity and popularity 
(Table 5) offer specific suggestions: If firms target a consumer segment using popular and 
general keywords, they can increase the absolute number of clicks and conversions by gaining an 
extreme price position, especially at the low extreme. Alternatively, it is possible to improve the 
efficiency of search advertising, in terms of profitability, by adjusting the price to a moderate 
level. However, if firms target a consumer segment using niche and specific keywords, the price 
rank does not matter. 
1.7.3 Limitations and Further Research 
Although this study offers important insights on the role of price rank and the effects of its 
interaction with keyword attributes, some limitations also suggest research opportunities. First, I 
focus on price rank, yet sponsored keyword advertising contains diverse information, such as the 
seller’s reputation, review comments, and temporary promotions. Both seller reputation and 
consumer comments are critical inputs that online consumers use in their purchase decisions 
(Chen and Xie 2008; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Liu 2006). Research that incorporates these 
diverse aspects of online environments could deepen understanding of consumers’ responses to 
sponsored keyword advertising.  
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Second, searches in online shopping websites also produce organic listings. Although I 
controlled for the effect of these organic listings by including their average price, further 
research might examine the influence of organic listings in more detail.   
Third, further research should include more diverse keyword attributes, beyond specificity 
and popularity, to determine their segmentation potential, according to their ability to reflect 
consumers’ knowledge, interests, or search goals. Investigating more diverse search keywords 
would be a promising path toward a greater understanding of consumers and their behaviors in 
online advertising environments.  
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ESSAY TWO: Dynamic Effects of Cross-Channel Price Integration: Evidences 
from a Quasi-Experiment 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Multi-channel sellers often face a decision of whether to coordinate product prices across 
channels. By leveraging a revised pricing policy implemented by an appliance retailer to its 
online and offline channels, the current research estimates the causal effects of price integration 
on the retailer’s product sales as well as individual consumers’ purchasing amount. This price 
variation event reveals varying effects on product sales across time, products, channels, and 
consumer segments. As an immediate consequence, price integration leads to a 14.70% decrease 
in sales of products without coordinated services across channels but a 14.68% increase in sales 
of products with coordinated services. The price integration effect is more positive in the long 
run, such that sales of products increase by 10.07% without coordinated services and 36.07% 
with coordinated services. Price integration is more likely to affect sales of products without 
coordinated services through online channels but products with coordinated services through 
offline channels. Finally, the consumer segmentation analysis suggests that the price integration 
is favorable to experience-sensitive consumers but is unfavorable to price-sensitive consumers. 
These findings provide unique insights on cross-channel pricing strategies and managerial 
implications for designing an effective strategy.  
 
Keywords: cross-channel pricing, channel-specific pricing, price integration, perceived 
transaction value, service coordination, product sales, dynamic effects. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Retailers often integrate channels to provide more consistent shopping experiences to 
consumers; by coordinating processes and technologies across all detached channels, it pursues 
“a consistent, yet unique and contextual brand experience across multiple customer-aware 
touchpoints” (Walker 2018). Retailers consider their cross-channel integration efforts a top 
priority (Staista 2017), though pricing strategies in these revised markets remain challenging 
(Grewal et al. 2010; Kireyev et al. 2017; Ratchford 2009; Wolk and Ebling 2010). Unlike a 
traditional, channel-specific pricing model—in which sellers price identical products differently 
across channels and focus on price competitiveness in each channel to meet the varying demands 
of consumers across channels (Liu et al. 2006; Ofek et al. 2011; Zettelmeyer 2000; Zhang 
2009)—cross-channel price integration strategy purposefully makes the boundaries across 
channels more permeable. A channel-specific pricing strategy might perform well in multi-
channel environments, which offer opportunities to exploit consumer surplus in each channel 
(Grewal et al. 1998; Khan and Jain 2005; Ratchford 2009; Robinson 1969). In contrast, a cross-
channel price integration strategy implements consistent prices across channels to a uniform 
level, thereby offering integrity and a seamless shopping experience (Saghiri et al. 2017; Verhoef 
et al. 2015).  
Such a price integration approach is getting popular that several retailers announced their 
uniform pricing strategy: Best Buy guarantees the same prices online and offline and offers QR-
coded price tags so offline consumers can check the online prices (RetailGeek 2010); Zara 
guarantees that their online stores offer the full range of articles that the brand currently offers in 
its stores, with the same prices and the same commercial policy (Bailay 2017). On the contrary, 
Walmart experienced criticisms and online sales drop by intentionally disclosing the price 
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discrepancies between online and offline stores (Anderson 2017; Hetu 2018). However, much 
less is known about the outcomes of this pricing strategy. In particular, this strategy, to some 
extent, contradicts price discrimination theory, which suggests charging prices that reflect 
consumers’ willingness to pay, to maximize profits and exploit consumer surplus (Khan and Jain 
2005; Robinson 1969). Charging channel-specific prices is a form of third-degree price 
discrimination that implies the firm is aware of differences in willingness to pay across but not 
within groups. Consistent prices across channels likely increase unexploited surplus, which 
means firms’ profits are not maximized (Church and Ware 2000). This inconsistency between 
research and practice requires empirical evidence to resolve it. 
First, a new price policy can have an immediate impact on sales, prompting both benefits 
and costs due to price changes in each channel, as well as confusion or inconvenience if 
consumers need to alter their shopping behaviors. In this sense, consumers need a “warm-up” 
period to become familiar with the new pricing strategy before they can fully evaluate and react 
to it (Venkatesh and Davis 2000). As they have opportunities to learn about the value of cross-
channel price ingegration, the impact might vary over time. I therefore investigate the dynamic 
impact of cross-channel price integration. Second, price integration provides more consistent 
shopping experiences, which need to be combined with other relevant marketing activities to 
improve prouct value for consumers. In particular, coordinated service is one of the most 
important determinents for perceived value of omni-channel experiences (Huang et al. 2009; 
Lynch Jr and Ariely 2000). Accordingly, I investigate the presence of coordianted service as a 
boundary condition that determines the effects of cross-channel price integration on product sales. 
I pose two research questions: 
1. What are the effects of a change from a channel-specific to a cross-channel integrated 
60 
 
pricing model on the retailer’s sales performance over time?  
2. How does the presence of a coordinated service in a product moderate the effect of the 
change of pricing models on the retailer’s short- and long-term sales performance?  
3.  How the dynamic effects of cross-channel price integration vary across consumers? 
I empirically investigate these research questions with a unique, quasi-experimental setting 
involving a leading household appliance retailer that shifted away from a channel-specific, 
mixed-pricing strategy to a uniform pricing strategy across channels.  
With a coarsened exact matching (CEM) approach to address potential selection bias, I 
analyze 1,110,703 transactions involving 4,150 products over an 18-month period (December 
2012–June 2014). These analyses suggest that price integration leads to a 14.70% immediate 
sales decrease for products without coordinated services but a 14.68% immediate sales increase 
for products with coordinated services. After a period (i.e., 6 months) of accommodation though, 
price integration improves sales for both types of products (without coordinated services, 10.07% 
future sales increase; with coordinated services, 36.07% future sales increase). Further, 
parametric and non-parametric (i.e., Generalized Synthetic Control methods) dynamic analyses 
suggest that all products, regardless of coordinated services, suffer from an immediate sales 
decreases, but the products with coordinated services recover from the immediate sales decreases 
much faster than the products without coordinated services. Finally, a consumer-level latent 
segment analysis investigates the dynamic effects of cross-channel price integration across 
consumers, that is, the changing shopping patterns of three consumer segments: the first segment 
favoring price integration from the beginning, the second segment negatively reacting to price 
integration, and the last segment holding a unfavorable attitude at first but turning favorable 
toward price integration over time. 
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With these findings, I make three main contributions. First, I reveal the dynamics of sales 
performance implications of cross-channel price integration. By considering price integration in 
a multi-channel retailing context composed of online and offline channels, this study offers novel 
insights about how consumers react to this strategy. Second, I empirically test and show the role 
of coordinated services in implementing cross-channel price integration. I maintain that 
coordinating services can enhance consumers’ shopping experiences associated with price 
integration across channels and increase consumers’ cost of searching and switching to other 
retailers. The results show coordinating services across online and offline channels improves 
product sales following price integration. Third, through the further analysis at the consumer 
level, this study enhances our understanding of characteristics of consumers exhibiting different 
purchasing behaviors to cross-channel price integration.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Background 
2.3.1 Perceived Transaction Value: Price vs. Experience 
Consumers evaluate a transaction by comparing the perceived value of the product and the 
cost to obtain it (Zeithaml 1988). The perceived value a consumer receives from a product not 
only includes the value of the product, but also the value of shopping experience (Ghosh and 
MacLafferty 1987; Kerin et al. 1992). Multi-channel retailers usually implement either a 
channel-specific pricing strategy or a cross-channel price integration strategy. The two pricing 
strategies aim to increase retailers’ competitiveness by either providing cost saving opportunities 
through flexible prices across channels or improving shopping experience through consistent 
prices across channels. In a channel-specific pricing strategy, sellers offer a reservation price for 
consumers in some channels and a lower price for consumers in other channels (Stahl 1989; 
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Varian 1980). By charging channel-specific prices, a retailer can compete with other retailers 
while maintaining profitability (Grewal et al. 2010; Huppertz et al. 1978; Khan and Jain 2005; 
Ratchford 2009). Reflecting consumers’ willingness to pay and information asymmetry across 
channels, retailers have incentives to offer lower prices to attract consumers who are price 
sensitive and search more, but charge higher prices to exploit those who are less price sensitive 
and thus search less. This reflects a flexible Hi-Lo promotion oriented pricing strategy 
implemented across channels, which allows to differentiate prices depending on consumer 
characteristics in terms of price sensitivity (Hoch, Dreze, and Purk 1994). This pricing policy can 
also differentiate informed and uninformed consumers (Varian 1980). It has been highlighted 
that adopting a channel-specific pricing strategy tends to increase multi-channel retailers’ overall 
profits (Besanko et al. 1998; Khan and Jain 2005; Montgomery 1997).  
In contrast, a cross-channel price integration strategy aims to reduce price discrepancies 
across channels and establish a consistent shopping experience for consumers (Kauffman et al. 
2009; Saghiri et al. 2017; Verhoef et al. 2015). In so doing, retailers sacrifice pricing flexibility; 
by charging uniform prices across channels, they lose margins from previously higher priced 
channels and sales from previously lower priced channels. Yet a cross-channel price integration 
strategy can increase retailers’ competitiveness and consumers’ transaction utility for two main 
reasons.  
First, price integration reduces consumers’ search effort, which should increase overall 
transaction value. When consumers encounter price discrepancies across channels, a natural 
response is to search for alternative options (Grewal et al. 1998; Lynch Jr and Ariely 2000). 
These searches impose extra, purchase-independent costs on consumers (Balasubramanian et al. 
2005; Fassnacht and Unterhuber 2016) and intensify price competition among retailers (Lynch Jr 
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and Ariely 2000). Integrated prices across channels provide a more consistent shopping 
experience, help mitigate consumers’ concerns about suffering from price differences (Campbell 
1999), and reduce incentives to search, either within or between retailers.  
Second, consistent pricing across channels can evoke positive emotions to consumers, such 
as predictability, trustworthiness, and reliability (Bolton et al. 2003; Campbell 1999; Fassnacht 
and Unterhuber 2016; Xia et al. 2004). Integrating product prices across channels relieves 
consumers’ concerns about experiencing price discrimination and enhances their trust in the 
retailers. Prior research has shown that changing prices can erode consumer confidence and 
make it difficult to communicate with consumers; for example, a consistent pricing policy such 
as EDLP has been noted as a way to maintain price consistency over time in a retail store 
(Ortmeyer, Quelch, and Salmon 1991). In a similar vein, cross-channel price integration can 
improve consumer confidence to the retailer by removing price variations among different 
channels of a retailer. As such, these two alternative pricing strategies in a multi-channel 
environment (i.e., channel-specific pricing and cross-channel price integration) have their own 
advantages.  
2.3.2 Perceived Transaction Value: Consumer Preferences 
Consumers perceive transaction value with various preferences. Zeithaml (1988) documents 
that consumers weigh “get” and “give” components of a product differently according to their 
preferences, whereby “get” components refer to benefits the consumers received from the 
transactions (e.g., quality, experiences, etc.) and “give” components refer to what consumers 
have to give up (e.g., price, search cost, etc.). Some consumers might consider “give” 
components as more important elements in evaluating transaction value, while others might 
consider “get” components as more salience in the value perception. For consumers with 
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different preferences, cross-channel price integration can have different effects on their value 
perceptions. The strategic focuses (i.e., pricing flexibility and pricing consistency) of the two 
strategies cater to consumers with different preferences. Pricing flexibility via the channel-
specific pricing strategy fits consumers preferring low prices and willing to search across 
channels; while the cross-channel price integration fits the consumers who prefer integrated 
channel and smooth channel switching experiences. 
I postulate that implementing cross-channel price integration influences product sales as a 
result of the changing composition of consumers. Retailers implementing cross-channel price 
integration would lose the attractiveness toward price sensitive consumers but gradually gain 
attractiveness toward consumers who prefer a more integrated multi-channel shopping 
experience. Further, price integration is a part of a firm’s marketing activities, which should be 
coordinated to maximize their impact on firm performance. I therefore propose that the effect of 
price integration can be magnified or reduced by complementary marketing activities. In 
particular, retailers often offer coordinated services across online and offline channels, such as 
allowing consumers searching the online store to arrange offline visit to get a consulting service 
at the nearest offline store, for products that may require additional information or customized 
service before consumers can make purchase decisions. For instance, when buying large house 
appliances such as washing machines and air conditioners, consumers would need to work with a 
specialty sales associate to customize details of product offerings and to see where and how it 
can be installed in their homes. I examine coordinated service as a factor that moderates the 
effect of price integration on the retailer’s sales performance.  
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2.4 Hypotheses 
2.4.1 Dynamic Effects of Price Integration 
Changing prices has a straightforward, immediate impact on product sales, especially on the 
price sensitive consumers. Frist, price sensitive consumers will respond promptly to the change 
of pricing policy, becoming dominant in a short term. An integrated pricing strategy proposes a 
retailer to charge price somewhere between the highest and lowest channel-specific prices to 
maintain a certain margin rate (Kauffman et al. 2009), and the retailer cannot flexibly 
accommodate the varying price preferences of consumers in each channel. In particular, online 
retailers tend to generate intensive price competition, and retailers offering consistent prices 
across channels will have difficulty to match the competitive online price, due to the higher 
operational costs of their offline stores, compared with online stores. Thus, price sensitive 
consumers are likely to purchase less or leave the multi-channel retailer offering integrated 
prices.  
Second, in a short term, it is difficult for consumers to realize the benefits of the new policy 
and adapt their behaviors. Consistent price is a key element for implementing channel integration 
in retailing, yet consumers may resist to a changed price policy, especially if the change forces 
them to alter their shopping behavior (Hoeffler 2003). Habits associated with an existing practice 
or behavior remain important barriers that create consumers’ resistance to change (Ram and 
Sheth 1989), and the resistance to the new pricing strategy in turn might hurt the immediate sales 
performance of the retailer. As such, consistent price across channels would not be optimal in a 
short term. I therefore predict that, 
H1: Changing from channel-specific to integrated pricing has a negative effect on short-term 
product sales than does maintaining channel-specific pricing. 
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A consistent pricing strategy may become more beneficial in a delayed fashion. First, 
through a progressive process, the existing customers have opportunities to assess the benefits of 
the new pricing policy and adapt their purchasing behaviors. In contrast to the direct numeric 
implications brought by the price change, the benefits of consistent pricing are relevant to 
improving service quality and shopping experiences, which are less direct and more subjective 
(Bolton and Drew 1991; Mitra and Golder 2006). For the acceptance of new practices, perceived 
usefulness increases with consumers’ familiarity (Davis et al. 1989; Venkatesh and Davis 2000). 
The market requires time to learn about the value of consistent shopping experiences associated 
with integrated prices across channels. Consumers also may need to verify the price integration, 
develop trust toward the retailer, and experience shopping under the new pricing policy. Over 
time, they gain more opportunities to realize the benefits of pricing consistency across channels. 
However, the need to engage in these learning activities delays their access to the benefits of the 
new price policy.  
Second, the price integration policy can gain its attractiveness toward new consumers who 
prefer an integrated shopping experiences without the hurdle of price discrepancy across its 
online and offline channels. It takes time for the focal retailer to build its reputation of offering 
consistent prices. Reputation is an estimation of the consistency over time of an attribute (Herbig 
et al. 1994), the retailer would need progressive efforts to build and maintain the reputation of 
consistent pricing. Further, it also takes time to distribute the reputation of offering consistent 
pricing to the potential consumers. The potential consumers might be reached through 
information diffusion processes such as advertisements and word-of-mouth effects. The 
information diffusion is usually considered as a process with delays (Koenig 1985; Trusov et al. 
2009). In the long run, there will be more chances to inform and convince potential customers 
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regarding the benefits associated with consistent prices across channels. Therefore, price 
integration should have a positive effect on the long-term product sales. Formally, 
H2: Changing from channel-specific to integrated pricing has a more positive effect on long-term 
product sales than does maintaining channel-specific pricing.  
2.4.2 Additional Value of Price Integration combined with Coordinated Service  
In addition to the product itself, the services are considered as another crucial intrinsic cues 
for perceived quality (Zeithaml 1988), especially for products that require sales specialties. 
Coordinated service across channels, such as pre-purchase consulting for online consumers in 
offline stores, offered during the purchase of products can weaken the negative influence and 
enhance the positive influence of price integration. On the one hand, integrated prices provide a 
more consistent shopping experience when coordinated services are provided. While price-
integrated products are vulnerable to price sensitive consumers, integrated prices combined with 
coordinated services can facilitate the process consumers realize the benefits of a more integrated 
shopping experiences across channels. Although coordinated services aim to encourage 
consumers to take full use of multi- channels (e.g., search online, face-to-face communication 
offline), the price discrepancy among channels motivate consumers to move toward the lower 
priced channel. Thus, offering consistent prices enable consumers to enjoy the coordinated 
product services without the concerns of being price discriminated. On the other hand, 
coordinated service can increase switching cost from one retailer to another (Porter 2008) and 
thus weaken the negative effects of losing pricing flexibility. The switching cost includes time 
and psychological efforts and the uncertainty to deal with a new sales associate (Dick and Basu 
1994; Jones et al. 2002). This can discourage price-sensitive consumers from switching to other 
retailers. By adding experience elements to products, the coordinated service also makes product 
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offerings less comparable with those of other retailers and relieves consumers’ price sensitivities 
(Burnham et al. 2003; Lynch Jr and Ariely 2000). Thus, I predict the moderating effects of 
coordinated services for both short- and long-term sales effects of the change to integrated 
pricing.  
H3: The presence of service (a) reduces the negative effect of the change to integrated pricing on 
short-term product sales and (b) enhances the positive effect of the change to integrated pricing 
on long-term product sales. 
 
2.5 Research Context  
The research relies on a quasi-experiment, featuring a pricing policy change by a leading 
multi-channel home appliance and electronics retailer. Up until 2013, the retailer maintains more 
than 1600 brick-and-mortar stores across Asia and one online store and serves 167 million 
members. In 2013, the online store contributes 21% of the firm’s total revenue, and the 
percentage gradually increase to around 40% in 2017. Across its brick-and-mortar and online 
stores, the retailer sells home appliances, computer, communication, consumer electronics, books, 
and general merchandise, spanning more than 3 million stock keeping units. Before 2013, the 
retailer has announced several omni-channel activities such as Buy-Online-Pickup-in-Store 
(BOPS) and coordinated services and sales guide. While the retailer allows products to adopt the 
channel-specific pricing strategy that it charged different prices between online and offline 
channels, and in mid-2013, it announced a new plan to integrate retail prices across channels. 
The focal retailer was among the first to implement the cross-channel price integration policy in 
mainland China. Through integrating product prices across channels, the retailer aims to enhance 
the omni-channel experiences by provide “a smoother shopping journey”. Product manufacturers 
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can choose to opt out from the new uniform pricing and stay with their existing pricing plan. 
Thus, the experimental group assignments are exogenous to the retailer. After integrating the 
product prices across channels, the participated products were guaranteed to have matched 
product prices, inventory and promotions across channels. After price integration, some 70% of 
the retailer’s products were marked to represent the “same price” in both online and offline 
stores; the other 30% retained the existing pricing strategy. I assign products to the treatment 
group if their prices are integrated or the control group if not. For products affected by the new 
policy (i.e., treated group), the uniform prices, the values of which are usually between online 
and offline pre-policy prices, are set to maintain the pre-policy margin rate based on the sales 
predictions, and the uniform prices will be adjusted at the same pace if necessary. Products that 
participated in the program after the initial date (i.e., June 8) are excluded from our sample for 
analyses. 
 
2.6 Product-Level Analysis: Effects of Cross-Channel Price Integration 
2.6.1 Data 
The data set comprises 1,110,703 transactions involving 4,150 products between December 
2012 and July 2014, made by customers living in six cities in mainland China. The products are 
assigned to seven main categories: air conditioners (4.12%), refrigerators & washing machines 
(7.61%), kitchen & bath (6.10%), TV & home Theater (5.73%), digital appliance (10.75%), 
computers (19.81%), telecommunications (9.40%), and small appliances (36.48%). For each 
transaction, I gather the transaction time, online and offline retail prices, number of units sold, 
transaction channel, product information, and customer demographics. The 6-month period 
before the treatment (i.e., pricing policy change) provides the baseline condition, and the 12-
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month period after the treatment provides the contrast between the sales of treated group and 
control group. Of the sampled products, 2,580 (62.17%) were affected by price integration and 
assigned to the treatment group. Figure 4 illustrates the empirical setting.  
Figure 4
Quasi-Experiment Design
Before Period
Price Discrepancy Price Discrepancy
Price Discrepancy Price Integration
Treatment Group
(Price integrated)
Control Group 
(Price not integrated)
Jun 2013
Price Integration
Price Discrepancy
Dec 2012
Short-term 
after-treatment
Long-term 
after-treatment
Dec 2013 Jun 2014
Before-treatment
 
2.6.2 Measures  
The unit of analysis is product. I aggregate the individual transactions into 15-day periods. 
For product i at period t, I calculate overall product sales (i.e., Salesit). Then Groupi is a dummy 
variable indicating whether product i is in the treatment group, and Treatt indicates if time t is 
after the treatment. The interaction term Groupi × Treatt pinpoints the treatment condition. In 
addition, Servicei indicates whether professional pre-purchase consulting (i.e., face-to-face 
expertise advice) can be arranged for online consumers in their nearby offline stores. Of the 
4,150 products, 978 (23.57%) include coordinated services. The retailer indicated that services 
mainly apply to products such as air conditioners, refrigerators, washing machines, kitchen 
appliances, and bath appliances, whereas computers, cell phones, televisions, cameras, and 
telecommunication equipment rarely include service elements. Purchasing products associated 
with professional services requires consumers to work with the “specialty labor” from the retailer 
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regarding any customized accommodation. A specialty sales associate will be assigned to assist 
the consumer throughout the purchase process. The specialty sales associates usually 
communicate with consumers face-to-face in the brick-and-mortar stores, and through an online 
chatting system in the online store. In contrast, purchasing a standard product without services is 
usually self-serviced, or with the help of a general sales associate.  
I use two continuous variables to capture the difference of the product prices between online 
and offline channels prior to the pricing policy change, such that Online_Highi measures the 
price discrepancies if online price is higher than offline price, and Offline_Highi measures the 
price discrepancies if online price is higher than offline price. The patterns of price discrepancies 
hold for control group products before and after the treatment, so they provide an effective 
baseline for the between-group comparison.  
Finally, I include several covariate variables in the analyses: Popularityi is the cumulative 
units of product i sold in 2012; Competitionit refers to the number of alternative products within 
the sub-category; Priceit equals the average transaction price of the product; and Multi_Ratioit 
captures the percentage of sales contributed by consumers using both online and offline stores, 
determined according to their membership status. Table 10 summarizes the names, definitions, 
and measures of our key variables. 
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Constructs Definitions Operationalizations
Product level analysis
Group Products which follow the 
consistent pricing after Jun 2013
Dummy variable Group i  = 1, indicating product i  follows 
the consistent pricing policy (Treatment Group)
Treat The period after treatment Dummy variable Treat t  = 1, indicating time t  is after the 
policy change (June 2013)
Sales Product sales Total number of units sold for product i  in time t ; Sales it
Sales_Online Product sales through online 
channel
Total number of units sold through online channel for 
product i  in time t ; Sales_Online it
Sales_Offline Product sales through offline 
channel
Total number of units sold through offline channel for 
product i  in time t ; Sales_Offline it
Sales_Single Product sales  contributed by 
online-only customers
Total number of unit sold contributed by online-only 
customers for product i  in time t ; Sales_Single it
Sales_Omni Product sales contributed by 
omni-channel customers 
Total number of units sold contributed by omni-channel  
for product i  in time t ; Sales_Omni it
Online_high Products having higher online 
retail price 
Dummy variable Online_high i  = 1, indicating the number 
of days with higher online prices is larger for product  i 
before treatment
Offline_high Products having higher offline 
retail price
Dummy variable Offline_high it = 1, indicating the number 
of days with higher offline prices is larger  for product  i 
before treatment
Service Product associated with service Dummy variable Service i  = 1, indicating product i belongs 
to the product category need services
Price Average Product Price The average unit price of product i in time t ; Price it
Table 10
Constructs, Definitions, and Operationalizations
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Popularity The popularity of the product Total number of product i  sold in 2012; Popularity i
Competition The competition of the product 
faced
The number of alternative products sold within the sub-
category where product i  belongs; Competition i
Multi_Ratio The extent of omni-channel 
usage
The percentage of sales contributed by omni-channel 
customers over all sales
International The origin of the firm Dummy variable International i  = 1, indicating product i 
belongs to a international firm
Public The firm ownership status Dummy variable Public i  = 1, indicating product i belongs 
to an IPOed firm
Nproduct The length of product line The number of products belongs to the firm of product  i
Consumer level analysis
Sales Consumer sales Total number of units of product j  (j=1 for price integrated 
product, j=0 otherwise) purchased by consumer i  in time t ; 
Sales ijt
Age Consumer age The self-reported age of consumer i ; Age i
Membership Consumer membership level The consumer i 's membership level at time t , ranging from 0 
(lowest) to 4 (highest); Membership it
Table 10 (Cont')
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2.6.3 Methods: Coarsened Exact Matching 
In an ideal setting, with a randomized assignment, the difference between control and 
treatment groups would represent the treatment effect. In our research context, the manufacturers 
might self-select into the price integration choice. As with all observational studies, there is a 
possibility of selection bias, such that the treatment group might differ systematically from the 
corresponding control group. A common way to address this issue is to use matched sampling, 
which selects units from a large reservoir of potential controlled samples to produce a control 
group that is similar to a treated group with respect to the distribution of some observed 
covariates to reduce the possibility of a selection bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). 
I use coarsened exact matching (hereafter CEM) to match treatment and control groups 
(Iacus et al. 2012). As a variation of exact matching, CEM relies on a coarsened range of 
covariates, which represents the joint distribution of all covariances, instead of matching on their 
exact values. Because CEM directly matches on the multivariate distributions of covariates, 
instead of on a single scale (e.g., propensity score), it does not rely on the functional form or 
discriminative ability of a first-stage propensity score model and integrates higher moments of 
the covariate distributions (Iacus et al. 2012).  
I perform full-sample CEM with 27 variables, such as sales, revenues, and product 
characteristics (see Table 11 for details), and match the before-treatment aggregates of the  
control and treatment groups. I break the joint distribution of all 27 variables into 1184 strata and 
conduct within-strata matching. Through this matching process, I obtain a matched sample of 
443,913 transactions with 2,547 products, as detailed in Table 11. To test the performance of 
CEM, I also performed the 1-to-1 Propensity Score Matching (hereafter PSM) with the same set 
of variables. The differences between the treatment and control groups suggest CEM 
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outperforms PSM, thus I adopt the CEM to match experimental samples. The comparison 
between joint distributions of PSM-matched sample and CEM-matched samples also suggest 
CEM outperforms PSM. The CEM significantly improves the similarity between the joint 
distributions of the two groups, in contrast to PSM-matched sample and the before-matching 
sample (figures in Appendix F). I report the after-matching summary statistics in Table 12.
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Treat Control Diff Treat Control Diff Treat Control Diff
Sales 60.11 159.84 -99.73 40.69 159.84 -119.15 46.22 69.01 22.79
Sales_online 32.58 63.71 -31.13 21.77 63.71 -41.94 25.78 37.54 11.76
Sales_offline 27.53 96.13 -68.60 18.92 96.13 -77.21 20.44 31.47 11.03
Sales_omni 43.07 100.90 -57.83 29.74 100.90 -71.16 32.67 49.33 16.66
Sales_online_omni 30.81 59.21 -28.39 20.99 59.21 -38.22 24.49 36.00 11.50
Sales_offline_omni 12.26 41.69 -29.43 8.75 41.69 -32.94 8.18 13.33 5.15
Sales_single 17.04 58.94 -41.91 10.95 58.94 -47.99 13.55 19.68 6.14
Sales_online_single 1.76 4.50 -2.74 0.78 4.50 -3.72 1.29 1.54 0.25
Sales_offline_single 15.27 54.44 -39.17 10.17 54.44 -44.27 12.26 18.14 5.88
Revenue 63363.81 348589.60 -285225.79 24398.79 348589.61 -324190.82 54317.90 78814.07 24496.17
Revenue_online 30246.54 106081.90 -75835.36 11226.18 106081.95 -94855.77 19286.90 25337.25 6050.35
Revenue_offline 33117.27 242507.70 -209390.43 13172.61 242507.66 -229335.05 35031.00 53476.82 18445.82
Online_ratio 0.55 0.42 0.13 0.57 0.42 0.15 0.54 0.54 0.00
Price 1112.94 2109.46 -996.52 829.57 2109.46 -1279.89 1030.12 1079.49 49.37
Service 0.15 0.37 -0.21 0.12 0.37 -0.25 0.14 0.14 0.00
Online_high 0.23 0.30 -0.07 0.17 0.30 -0.13 0.26 0.26 0.00
Offline_high 0.37 0.61 -0.24 0.18 0.61 -0.42 0.46 0.46 0.00
Popularity 590.59 560.35 30.24 724.58 560.35 164.24 368.53 376.15 7.62
Competition 1489.53 1565.19 -75.66 1532.64 1565.19 -32.55 1282.16 1298.64 16.48
Category1 0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00
Category2 0.03 0.15 -0.12 0.00 0.15 -0.15 0.04 0.04 0.00
Category3 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
Category4 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.00
Category5 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.40 0.09 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.00
Category6 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00
Category7 0.35 0.38 -0.03 0.18 0.38 -0.20 0.55 0.55 0.00
Category8 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.00
Obs 2564 1586 1586 1586 1454 1093
Table 11
Product-Level Analysis: Sample Matching Results
Before matching
After matching
PSM CEM
77 
 
Variables Mean Std. Min Max
Popularity 379.49 814.91 1.00 5458.25
Competition 1316.24 1789.32 7.00 9833.00
Service 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Online_high 15.37 74.61 0.00 1413.74
Offline_high 58.41 154.70 0.00 1753.44
6-month period before treatment  (per product)
Sales 4.91 8.46 0.00 222.00
Online Sales 2.38 5.72 0.00 220.00
Offline Sales 2.53 5.63 0.00 135.00
Single Sales 1.64 3.72 0.00 100.00
Omni Sales 3.27 6.15 0.00 191.00
Price 1312.40 1660.64 1.00 10829.33
Omni_Ratio 0.46 0.42 0.00 1.00
6-month period after treatment (per product)
Sales 4.46 10.81 0.00 520.00
Online Sales 2.87 7.99 0.00 353.00
Offline Sales 1.59 6.70 0.00 520.00
Single Sales 1.02 3.79 0.00 335.00
Omni Sales 3.44 8.29 0.00 404.00
Price 1228.90 1562.77 1.00 9490.00
Omni_Ratio 0.48 0.45 0.00 1.00
6-month period after 6 months of treatment  (per product)
Sales 5.16 12.32 0.00 594.00
Online Sales 2.85 8.18 0.00 448.00
Offline Sales 2.31 8.80 0.00 594.00
Single Sales 0.68 2.25 0.00 95.00
Omni Sales 4.48 11.02 0.00 554.00
Price 1225.77 1571.87 1.00 9490.00
Omni_Ratio 0.50 0.46 0.00 1.00
Product-Level Analysis: Summary Statistics 
Table 12
 
2.6.4 Model Specification 
I anticipate three variations: between the before- and after-treatment periods, between 
treatment and control groups, and between products with coordinated services and products 
without coordinated services. I adopt a differences-in-differences-in-difference approach with a 
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weighted random-effect negative binomial (RENB) framework (Hausman et al. 1984). The 
weighted RENB accounts for overdispersion and the correlation between before- and after-
treatment periods. For product i in period t, I have  
(20) , 
where t = 0, 1, 2;  is the random effect for product i that accounts for product-level 
heterogeneity; and  is the weights of product i generated through full-sample CEM. The term 
exp( ) follows a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance k, where k is the overdispersion 
parameter in the NB model. When there is no overdispersion (i.e., k = 1), RENB is equivalent to 
random-effect Poisson. Furthermore,  is an idiosyncratic error term that captures all omitted 
variances specific to product i and time t.  Thus, 
(21) , 
where Saleit is the number of units sold of product i during time t; Timet = 1 if time t is in the 
after-policy period; Groupi = 1 if the product i belongs to the treatment group; Servicei = 1 if the 
product i requires additional services; the Online_Highi and Offline_Highi are two time-invariant 
variables describing the prices discrepancies between online and offline channels for product i 
before treatment; and Wit contains a vector of covariates for product i at time t, including the 
average price (Priceit), popularity of the product (Popularityi), competition in the sub-category 
(Competitioni), percentage of transactions contributed by multi-channel customers 
(Multi_Ratioit),  and seven dummy variables for the product categories.  
The within-group comparison involves product sales before and after treatment; the 
between-group comparison pertains to the treatment and control groups and indicates that the 
effects are not due to time-variant unobserved factors. The difference-in-difference estimators  
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and  capture the treatment effects and the differences of treatment effects between products 
with services and without services, respectively.  
2.6.5 Identification Assumption 
The identifying assumption of a differences-in-difference model is that the treatment group, 
had it not been treated, would have followed the same trajectory as the control group. The 
presence of differential time trends might cast doubt on the validity of this assumption. To verify 
that the matched samples follow the common trend assumption, I calculate group average in 15-
day window overall sales for the control and treatment groups (Figure 5) and conduct a common 
trend analysis with the 15-day aggregates (Table 13). The two groups closely resemble each 
other in terms of sales, online sales, and offline sales in the 6-month period before the policy 
change (Period -11 to Period -1); significant trend differences appear only after the treatment 
(Period 0). This evidence suggests that our matching procedure reduces differences in trends, and 
the matched sample satisfies the common trend assumption in terms of our key dependent 
variables. 
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Dependent Sales log(Revenue+1) Sales_Online Sales_Offline
Period -11 .035(.065) .072(.075) -.048(.088) .053(.111)
Period -10 -.073(.081) -.019(.106) -.099(.097) -.078(.125)
Period -9 -.121(.083) -.088(.082) -.142(.135) -.022(.109)
Period -8 -.141(.082)* -.115(.085) -.113(.133) -.135(.106)
Period -7 .024(.077) .075(.083) -.046(.121) .039(.114)
Period -6 -.047(.081) -.028(.081) -.062(.106) -.087(.112)
Period -5 -.044(.062) -.078(.069) -.193(.098)* -.167(.119)
Period -4 -.078(.064) -.036(.069) -.135(.112) -.127(.118)
Period -3 .067(.063) .079(.066) -.014(.100) .113(.122)
Period -2 -.038(.063) -.071(.071) -.075(.084) -.136(.105)
Period -1 .009(.056) .010(.063) -.048(.083) .025(.106)
Period 1 .344(.080)*** .312(.085)*** .345(.100)*** .408(.133)***
Period 2 .125(.063)** .058(.071) .107(.093) .120(.132)
Period 3 .136(.062)** .021(.068) .024(.102) .234(.146)
Period 4 .206(.064)*** .147(.065)** .117(.087) .292(.121)**
Period 5 .034(.086) -.020(.083) .057(.087) .023(.166)
Period 6 .037(.111) .058(.091) .058(.097) -.018(.204)
Period 7 .203(.065)*** .121(.071) .161(.083)* .284(.133)**
Period 8 .044(.065) .085(.074) -.060(.089) .235(.114)**
Period 9 .260(.063)*** .191(.070)** .195(.088)** .318(.154)**
Period 10 .240(.081)*** .215(.079)*** .159(.090)* .259(.164)
Period 11 .200(.066)*** .157(.066)** .085(.091) .427(.116)***
Period 12 .183(.064)*** .191(.067)*** .050(.085) .433(.118)***
Period 13 .457(.075)*** .492(.080)*** .424(.099)*** .380(.124)***
Period 14 .355(.068)*** .454(.078)*** .254(.086)*** .450(.121)***
Period 15 .333(.063)*** .367(.074)*** .243(.082)*** .441(.128)***
Period 16 .341(.067)*** .382(.071)*** .258(.097)** .464(.129)***
Period 17 .510(.062)*** .477(.066)*** .381(.083)*** .876(.140)***
Period 18 .592(.082)*** .668(.114)*** .453(.100)*** .932(.145)***
Period 19 .471(.064)*** .517(.072)*** .391(.087)*** .667(.115)***
Period 20 .436(.065)*** .495(.072)*** .391(.090)*** .595(.129)***
Period 21 .752(.094)*** .839(.158)*** 1.256(.109)*** .035(.143)
Period 22 .453(.065)*** .496(.084)*** 3.067(.483)*** -.075(.116)
Period 23 .671(.079)*** .660(.088)*** 3.402(.417)*** .246(.127)*
Period 24 .837(.101)*** .894(.128)*** 2.996(.258)*** .619(.139)***
Table 13
Product-Level Analysis: Common Trend Analysis
Notes: the common trend analysis is conducted based on 15-day aggregate, the last period
before treatment (Period 0) is used as baseline group.
* p< 0.10, **p <0.05, ***p<0.01
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Figure 5
Comparison between Treatment and Control Groups
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2.6.6 Main Results 
I investigate the influences of price integration on product sales by exploiting the variance 
before versus after the implementation of the cross-channel price integration. The estimated 
results are reported in column 1 and 2 of Table 14, pertaining to the coefficients of the 
interaction term between Timet and Groupi and the three-way interaction, reveal a significant 
positive treatment effect (β = .035, p < .05) and a significant moderating effect of coordinated 
services (β = .179, p < .01). In other words, price integration increases sales of products without 
coordinated services by 3.56% and increases sales of products with coordinated services by 
23.86%. 
To understand the evolution of the impacts of price integration, I divided the post-treatment 
observations into two 6-month sub-samples, and reestimate the model with the baseline 
condition. The estimation results for the first post-treatment periods reflect the immediate 
impacts, while the second post-treatment periods reflect the impacts after a period of 
accommodation. The estimated results of the immediate impacts are reported in column 3 and 4 
of Table 14, pertaining to the coefficients of the interaction term between Timet and Groupi and 
the three-way interaction, reveal a significant negative treatment effect (β = -.163, p < .01) and a 
significant moderating effect of coordinated services (β = .353, p < .01). That is, price integration 
decreases sales of products without coordinated services by 15.04% and increases sales of 
products with coordinated services by 20.93% in the short term. That is, price integration has 
immediate negative impacts on sales of products without coordinated services but positive 
impacts on sales of products with coordinated services, in support of H1 and H3.  
The estimated results using the second post-treatment sub-sample are reported in column 5 
and 6 of Table 14, indicating that price integration has insignificant positive effects on sales of 
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products, both without (β = .204, p < .01) and with coordinated services (β = .077, p > .10). I 
thus find that price integration increases the long-term sales of products with and without 
coordinated services by 22.63%. Thus, the price integration increases long-term performances of 
products without coordinated services and products with coordinated services, in support for H2 
and H4. 
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(1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales
Constant -1.545(.043)*** -1.563(.044)*** -1.361(.049)*** -1.364(.050)*** -1.474(.051)*** -1.491(.052)***
Treat -.309(.031)*** -.259(.032)*** -.058(.030)* -.011(.030) -.394(.032)*** -.331(.032)***
Group -.188(.037)*** -.197(.038)*** -.091(.043)** -.102(.044)** -.187(.045)*** -.197(.046)***
Service -.233(.048)*** -.137(.055)** -.225(.057)*** -.190(.063)*** -.288(.058)*** -.183(.065)***
Treat×Group .062(.015)*** .035(.016)** -.111(.017)*** -.163(.018)*** .218(.017)*** .204(.019)***
Treat×Service -.362(.030)*** -.340(.034)*** -.427(.037)***
Group×Service .128(.043)*** .049(.047) .147(.047)***
Treat×Group×Service .179(.041)*** .353(.047)*** .077(.049)
Popularity -.013(.017) -.009(.017) -.005(.020) -.002(.020) -.027(.020) -.022(.020)
Competition -.087(.017)*** -.088(.017)*** -.105(.020)*** -.108(.020)*** -.094(.020)*** -.092(.020)***
Price -.063(.014)*** -.056(.014)*** -.031(.016)** -.026(.016) -.042(.016)** -.032(.016)**
Omni-channel ratio 2.182(.011)*** 2.185(.011)*** 1.992(.012)*** 1.993(.012)*** 2.193(.013)*** 2.201(.013)***
Online_High .003(.003) .004(.003) .001(.003) .001(.003) .012(.003)*** .012(.003)***
Offline_High .013(.002)*** .014(.002)*** .010(.003)*** .010(.003) .019(.003)*** .020(.003)***
IMR .010(.009) .014(.010) .013(.011) .013(.011) .003(.012) .006(.012)
Likelihood -188464.338 -126731.940 -126811.008 -126745.062 -127606.012 -127472.250
BIC 377545.588 377345.315 254084.892 253959.809 255674.945 255440.353
Obs 91692 91692 61128 61128 61128 61128
Product-Level Analysis: Estimation Results
Table 14
Notes. Parameters of interests are bold, and standard error in parentheses in table 5 and 6
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
First 6-month period Second 6-month periodOverall sample
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2.6.7 Dynamics of Price Integration  
The main analysis suggests that the impacts of price integration on product sales evolve 
over time, especially for the product without coordinated services. To further understand the 
dynamics, I conduct an additional analysis investigating the dynamic impacts of price integration. 
I replace the variable Timet with 35 dummy variables indicating each 15-day periods and re-
estimate the main results model.  
The Panel A of Figure 6 plots the estimated coefficients of  over time. The plot 
suggests that both products with coordinated services and without coordinated services suffer from a 
short period of sales decrease after the policy change. However, products with coordinated services 
recover from the sales decrease a lot faster than the products without coordinated services. In other 
words, it is easier for consumers to learn the advantages of the consistent pricing when they are shopping 
products with coordinated services than products without coordinated services.  
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Figure 6
The Comparison of Dynamic Effects between DiD and SC
 
2.6.8 Robustness Checks 
Fixed-effect negative binomial. I also try different model specifications. Instead of RENB, 
I re-run the analysis with a fixed-effect negative binomial, with fixed means and standard 
deviations. The results in Panel A of Table 15 again are consistent with our main results. I retain 
the REBN model because of its lower log-likelihoods. 
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K2K CEM matched sample. I also try different matching criterion. Instead of full sample 
CEM matching, I re-run the analysis with the k2k CEM matching. The k2k CEM matched 
sample include 818 products in control group and 818 products in the treated group. The results 
are reported in Panel B of Table 15, which is consistent with our main results.  
Zero-inflated negative binomial. Another concern that might affect the validity of 
estimation is the zero’s in our dependent variables. To verify that our estimation results are not 
sensitive to the zero’s, I re-run the analysis with zero-inflated negative binomial model where I 
use all the covariances to predict the zero’s in a logit framework. The results are reported in the 
Panel C of Table 15, which is consistent with our main results.  
Negative binomial with clustering standard errors. In the main analysis, I adopt the 
random-effect negative binomial model to account for the potential autocorrelation among 
within-panel observations. Another alternative way to address the within-panel autocorrelation is 
using clustering Standard Errors (Bertrand et al. 2004). To test the validity of our results, I re-
estimate the model using standard errors clustered at the brand-level. The results are reported in 
Panel D of Table 15, which is consistent with the results of random-effect model.
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Panel A: Fixed-Effect Negative Binomial Panel B: K2K CEM Matched Sample
Dependent Overall First half Second half Overall First half Second half Overall First half Second half
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales
Constant .637(.029)*** -1.261(.055)*** -1.326(.058)*** .678(.037)*** -.982(.055)*** -1.140(.057)*** -.423(.035)*** -.478(.042)*** -.397(.044)***
Treat -.466(.034)*** -.183(.032)*** -.523(.035)*** -.505(.041)*** -.220(.039)*** -.488(.041)*** -.153(.006)*** -.061(.008)*** -.222(.007)***
Group -.195(.041)*** -.057(.048) -.190(.051)*** -.235(.041)*** -.156(.047)*** -.205(.049)*** -.186(.023)*** -.100(.029)*** -.184(.029)***
Service -.229(.059)*** -.305(.068)*** -.321(.071)*** -.255(.060)*** -.244(.068)*** -.270(.072)*** -1.179(.030)*** -.989(.038)*** -1.183(.040)***
Treat×Group .033(.016)** -.169(.018)*** .202(.019)*** .030(.020) -.074(.023)*** .119(.024)*** .035(.009)*** -.166(.011)*** .212(.010)***
Treat×Service -.358(.031)*** -.331(.035)*** -.425(.038)*** -.316(.030)*** -.178(.033)*** -.489(.036)*** -.342(.012)*** -.317(.016)*** -.400(.015)***
Group×Service .182(.045)*** .091(.051)* .230(.051)*** .047(.047) -.046(.051) .060(.052) .125(.027)*** .064(.031)** .135(.032)***
Treat×Group×Service .179(.041)*** .354(.047)*** .082(.049) .051(.044) .154(.051)*** -.027(.053) .154(.020)*** .331(.025)*** .039(.023)
Popularity -.016(.019) -.028(.022) -.027(.023) -.021(.020) -.044(.023)* -.007(.024) -.002(.013) .001(.016) -.015(.016)
Competition -.113(.019)*** -.155(.024)*** -.131(.023)*** -.061(.024)** -.045(.028) -.081(.028)*** -.075(.012)*** -.110(.015)*** -.077(.017)***
Price -.074(.015)*** -.046(.018)** -.066(.018)*** .053(.016)*** .065(.019)*** .080(.019)*** -.068(.009)*** -.047(.012)*** -.048(.012)***
Omni_ratio 2.185(.011)*** 2.001(.012)*** 2.198(.013)*** 2.006(.012)*** 1.822(.015)*** 2.081(.016)*** 2.181(.006)*** 1.986(.008)*** 2.193(.009)***
Online_High -.002(.003) -.014(.004)*** -.010(.004)** -.007(.003)** -.008(.004)** -.004(.004) -.004(.002)** .001(.002) .011(.002)***
Offline_High .013(.003)*** .001(.003) .024(.003)*** .005(.003) .003(.004) .011(.004)** .014(.002)*** -.010(.002)*** -.019(.002)***
IMR .014(.010)*** .011(.012) .004(.013) .005(.010) .007(.011) -.003(.012) .012(.006)** .012(.007)* .003(.008)
Likelihood -173147.768 -112628.640 -113190.382 -126878.320 -87125.474 -84391.505 -189412.267 -127370.573 -128301.012
BIC 346924.236 225731.158 226854.608 254382.711 174727.231 169258.795 378938.667 254851.229 256712.107
Obs 91692 61128 61128 58896 39264 39264 91692 61128 61128
Panel C: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial
Table 15
Product-Level Analysis: Robustness Checks
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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2.6.9 Non-parametric Approach: Generalized Synthetic Control 
For DiD estimation, the identification of causal effect relies on the matched samples of 
Coarsened Exact Match based on 27 observed variables and the Heckman correction function. 
However, the validity of the exogenous variables in Heckman correction function and excluding 
the relevant unobserved variables might decreases the validity of parametric estimation results. 
To address these concerns, I adopt Generalized Synthetic Control (GSC) method (Xu 2017) to 
further examine the validity of the parametric estimation results. The proposed GSC model takes 
the following form: 
(22) , 
where the treatment indicator Dit equals 1 if product i has been affected by the price integration 
at time t, and equals 0 otherwise; δit is the homogenous treatment effect of product i at time t; xit 
is the vector containing time-variant covariances (i.e., Priceit and Omni_ratioit); ft= (f1t, f2t,…, frt) 
is a vector of unobserved common factors for time t; λit= (λit1, λit2,…, λitr) is the vector of 
unobserved factor loadings for product i at time t; αi is the product i's specific fixed effect; ηt is 
the fixed effect for time t; and εit is the normal idiosyncratic terms for product i at time t. The 
seemingly unrestricted unobserved factors and the product specific factor loadings could cover a 
wide range of unobserved heterogeneities. The average treatment effect on treated (ATT) at time 
t is captured by the average of homogenous treatment effects, i.e. .  
Identification. The key identification assumption for causal inference is that the error terms 
is independent with the treatment assignment, observed covariances, unobserved factors and 
factor loadings, i.e., εit ⊥ Dit, Xit, λi, ft. The addictive time and product fixed effects, and the 
unobserved factors would largely capture the confounders that affects the independence of the 
error terms. The time and product fixed effects could capture common trend of time and the 
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time-invariant product unobserved heterogeneity, whereas the unobserved manufacturer-time 
specific confounders could be captured by the unobserved factors. As I discussed earlier, the 
endogeneity concern of the DiD model is most likely derived from the nonrandom treatment 
assignments, i.e., manufacturers’ strategic decisions on whether to participant the price 
integration policy. The unobserved confounders could be decomposed into a common trend (i.e., 
the focal retailer initiating the idea of price integration) and the heterogenous impacts across 
products (i.e., manufacturers determine whether to participant based on their time-invariant 
heterogeneity). Thus, including the interactions between time-specific unobserved factors and 
product-specific factor loadings could alleviate the influences of the unobserved confounders. 
Estimation and Results. The GSC model is fitted with the unmatched full sample, including 
1,110,703 transactions of 4,150 products. The number of unobserved factors is selected by cross 
validation. I tried 1 to 5 unobserved factors and found that models with 2 unobserved factors 
display the best model fit. The estimation results are reported in Table 16 and the estimated 
unobserved factors are reported in the Web Appendix G.  
The column 1-3 of Table 16 reports the estimation results for the full sample, indicating a 
positive effect of price integration on product sales (ATT=.164, p<.01). Similar to the results of 
DiD model, I found that the impacts of price integration tend to be positive along the timeline, as 
the treatment effects in the first half of the post-treatment period is insignificant (ATT= .000, 
p>.10) and treatment effects become positive in the second half of the post-treatment period 
(ATT= .302, p<.01). Column 4-6 of Table 16 suggests that products with services suffer from 
sales decreases in the first half (ATT= -.109, p<.05) and enjoy sales increases in the second half 
(ATT= .276, p< .01). In contrast, products with services would enjoy an insignificant sales 
increase in the first half (ATT= .093, p>.10) and a significant sales increase in the second half 
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(ATT= .306, p<.05). The estimation results of GSC are largely consistent with the results of the 
DiD model with the matched sample.  
The panel B of Figure 3 plots the dynamics of ATT. In contrast to the DiD estimation, the 
estimations of GSC are smaller in terms of impact size, especially for products without services. 
While the general trend of the treatment dynamics is largely consistent for both products with 
services and products without services.  
(1) (2) (3)
Overall First half Second half
ATT .164(.017)*** .000(.054) .302(.019)***
Omni-channel ratio 1.000(.016)*** .944(.015) 1.025(.016)***
Price .247(.050)*** -.330(.063)*** -.085(.045)*
BIC -.471 -.191 -.292
Obs 149400 99600 99600
(4) (5) (6)
Overall First half Second half
ATT .036(.075) -.109(.054)** .276(.070)***
Omni-channel ratio .985(.016) .964(.019)*** .991(.019)***
Price .055(.065) .237(.126)* .263(.080)***
BIC -.631 -.398 -.481
Obs 114192 76128 76128
(7) (8) (9)
Overall First half Second half
ATT .126(.112) .093(.095) .306(.116)**
Omni-channel ratio .076(.019)*** .688(.023)*** .734(.021)***
Price -.367(.078)*** -.420(.095)*** -.256(.066)***
BIC -.576 -.248 -.452
Obs 35208 23472 23472
Table 16
Product-Level Analysis: Results for Generalized Synethic Control
Notes. Estimation is based on 2 latent factors selected by cross-validation
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Product with services
Product w/out services
All products
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2.7 Consumer-Level Analysis: Consumer Segmentation and Dynamics 
In previous section, the product-level analysis suggests that the impacts of cross-channel 
price integration on product sales turns from negative to positive over time. Theoretically, our 
framework posits that the effects of price integration are attributed to the interactions between 
the two strategic focuses — pricing flexibility (i.e., better prices) and pricing consistency (i.e., 
better experiences), by either attracting or repelling consumers with certain preferences 
(e.g., ”give” focus vs. “get” focus)(Zeithaml 1988). The attractiveness of a pricing policy to 
individual consumers with varying preferences cannot be investigated at the product-level 
analysis. I therefore further conduct the consumer-level analysis to investigate the dynamic 
effects of cross-channel price integration on the consumers’ product purchasing. 
2.7.1 Research Context and Data 
The unit of analysis is individual consumers of the focal retailer used in the product-level 
analysis. The data set of this consumer-level analysis comprises individual transactions of the 
sampled consumers between December 2012 and July 2014. To avoid the influences of outliers, 
consumers with order amounts below 1% and above 99% quantile are excluded. I end up with 
1,190,225 transactions of 63,526 consumers. Within the 18-month period, the average number of 
purchases per consumer is 18.73 (min 3 and max 195), with 75.27% products being affected by 
the policy change, and the average spending is 37,776.03 local currency (min 105 and max 
712,788). Among the sampled consumers, 19,866 (31.78%) are those who completed their first 
transaction after the policy change during our data window.  
2.7.2 Measures  
I aggregate the individual transactions of products affected by the price integration (i.e., 
treated group) and products not affected by the price integration (i.e., control group) separately 
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into 3-month periods for each consumer. For consumer i at time t, Salesi1t is the number of 
purchased products affected by the price integration, and Salesi0t is the number purchased 
products not affected by the price integration. For each consumer, there are 12 quarterly 
aggregated observations within the 18-month periods. The price integration occurred on the first 
day of the third quarter. The bottom part of Table 1 explains the definition and operationalization 
of the three key variables for the consumer-level analysis.  
2.7.3 Model Specification 
A latent class model with a zero-inflated Poisson framework is adopted to analyze the 
individual-level data. Conditional on a finite mixture of K consumer segments, the conditional 
likelihood function of consumer i's observations on sales  is given as: 
(23) ,  
where yijt is the number of products affected by price integration (j=1) or number of products not 
affected by price integration (j=0) purchased by consumer i at time t,  i.e., Salesijt; K is the 
number of latent consumer segments; Ti is the number of observations of consumer i; 
 is the vector of covariates of consumer i of Ti periods;  
is the vector of coefficients contains the coefficients of all K segments;  is the 
vector of standard deviations for all K classes.  is the vector of the K-1 
independent probability of consumer i belongs to group k (k=1,2…,K-1), defined as: 
(24) , and . 
Given the individual probability , the mixing proportions of latent segments in the 
population could be calculated as , where N is the total number of consumers.  
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The dependent variable yijt is assumed to follow a zero-inflated Poisson distribution: 
(25) , 
where qitk is the norm link function , Iijt is the indicator that 
equals 1 if yijt =0, and R (yijt) is defined as: 
(26) / , and 
(27)  
where θ is the inverse of overdispersion parameter; Groupijt is a dummy indicator indicating 
if consumer i's jth aggregate is the number of products affected by price integration purchased at 
time t; Quartert = (Quarter2t, Quarter3t, Quarter4t, Quarter5t, Quarter6t) is the vector of 6 
quarter dummy variables of time t. The policy change (i.e., price integration) occurred on the 
first day of the third quarter, thus including Quarter3t to Quarter6t are equivalent to including 
the treatment indicator.  is the consumer i's registered age,  is the membership level 
(from 0 to 4) of consumer i at time t, and  is the idiosyncratic normal error term. 
2.7.4 Results 
The model is estimated with the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) algorithm. 
Models with 2 to 9 latent classes are tested and the model with 6 latent classes displays the best 
model fit (i.e., lowest BIC). Table 17 reports the estimation results of the latent class zero-
inflated Poisson model. 
The results suggest that the sampled consumers could be categorized into three categories: 
lovers, haters and adapters. Specifically, the first category of consumers, lovers (i.e., segment 1 
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and 2), are the consumers whose sales are mostly positively affected by the price integration. 
Specifically, the price integration policy has a strong and positive effects on the sales of 
consumers in the segment 1 (β21= 1.017, p<.01; β31= 1.128, p<.01; β41= 1.207, p<.01; β51= 1.297, 
p<.01) and segment 2 (β22= .302, p<.01; β32= .599, p<.01; β42= .880, p<.01; β52= .950, p<.01). 
The second category of consumers, haters (i.e., segment 3 and 4), are the consumers whose sales 
are strongly negatively affected by the price integration, and time doesn’t weaken the negative 
effects. Specifically, the price integration has a negative effect on the sales of consumers in 
segment 3 (β23= -.836, p<.01; β33= -.936, p<.01; β43= -.696, p<.01; β53= -.654, p<.01) and 
segment 4 (β24= -.012, p>.10; β34= -.611, p<.01; β44= -.746, p<.01; β54= -.741, p<.01). The last 
category of consumers, adaptors (i.e., segment 5 and 6), are the consumers whose sales are 
negatively affected by the price integration at the beginning, and the negative impacts gradually 
becomes positive along the timeline. In specific, the effects of price integration turn from 
negative to positive for consumers in segment 5 (β25= -.499, p<.01; β35= -.250, p<.01; β45= .065, 
p<.01; β55=.150, p<.01) and segment 6 (β26= -.133, p<.01; β36= .187, p<.01; β46= .595, p<.01; 
β56= .609, p<.01). In other words, time has a positive moderating effect on the impacts of price 
integration on the sales for these consumers. 
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Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5 Segment 6
Constant 1.805(.005)*** -.935(.006)*** -.887(.006)*** -.527(.008)*** .313(.005)*** -.078(.005)***
Group -.699(.044)*** .991(.007)*** 1.783(.006)*** 1.864(.009)*** .097(.007)*** 1.176(.005)***
Group*Quarter3 1.017(.044)*** .302(.008)*** -.836(.009)*** -.012(.008) -.499(.013)*** -.133(.008)***
Group*Quarter4 1.128(.044)*** .599(.008)*** -.936(.009)*** -.611(.010)*** -.250(.011)*** .187(.007)***
Group*Quarter5 1.207(.044)*** .880(.008)*** -.696(.008)*** -.746(.011)*** .065(.009)*** .595(.007)***
Group*Quarter6 1.297(.044)*** .950(.008)*** -.654(.008)*** -.741(.010)*** .150(.008)*** .609(.006)***
Prob(λ) .190*** .152*** .259*** .016*** .304*** .079***
Adapters
Table 17
Consumer-Level Analysis: Estimation Results for Latent Class Model
Notes. Other covariances are not reported for parsinomy
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Lovers Haters
 
 
 
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5 Segment 6
Online ratio .248 .302 .442 .359 .312 .301
Cheaper channel ratio .306 .337 .552 .441 .337 .318
Membership status 2.004 1.849 1.854 1.893 1.900 1.917
Return consumer ratio .540 .321 .266 .283 .311 .371
Table 18
Consumer Characteristics Across Latent Segments
Lovers Haters Adapters
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2.7.5 Post Hoc Analysis: Consumer Characteristics across Segments 
To further uncover the impacts of price integration across consumer segments, consumer 
characteristics are calculated. The selected consumer characteristics include the ratio of online 
purchases in pre-treatment period, ratio of orders from the lower-priced channel in the pre-
treatment period (i.e., price sensitivity), the average membership level (i.e., life time value) and 
the ratio of consumers who made no purchase in the 6-month pre-treatment period (i.e., returning 
consumers). Table 18 summarizes consumer characteristics in each latent segment. For the lovers, 
it is worth noting that this category has relatively more returning consumers (54.0% and 32.1%). 
Among the remaining non-returning consumers, they have a relatively lower ratio of online 
shopping (24.8% and 30.2%). In contrast, consumers in the category of haters shop more 
frequently in online channel (44.2% and 35.9%), more likely to select the lower-priced channel 
(55.2% and 44.1%) and are relatively lower in membership level (1.854 and 1.893). In summary, 
the consumers who are shopping online frequently and price sensitive are more likely to be 
driven away by the price integration policy, whereas consumers who are less price sensitive and 
high in consumer life time values are more likely to accept the policy. 
The results of our consumer-level analysis shed lights on the interactive nature of the 
underlying mechanisms. In particular, the results suggest the existence of three groups of 
consumers: the group of price sensitive consumers and online shoppers leave after the price 
increase caused by the price integration policy; the group of offline shoppers and returning 
customers are more likely to be attracted by the price integration regardless of price change; 
while the rest consumers tend to leave after the price increase and then gradually attracted by 
benefits of pricing consistency.  
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2.8 General Discussion 
2.8.1 Theoretical Implications 
This research offers the first empirical test of the effects of implementing a cross-channel 
price integration on the product sales in the context of multi-channel retailers. Three key findings 
emerge from these analyses.  
First, cross-channel price integration immediately lowers the sales of products regardless of 
coordinated services. After a period of accommodation, price integration increases sales of 
products without services in a slower pace and increases the sales of products with coordinated 
services in a much faster pace. Further, our consumer segmentation analysis further reveals that 
implementing price integration eventually attract consumers with preferences for consistent 
experiences but repel customers with preferences for better prices.  
Second, this research contributes to emerging multi-channel literature by investigating the 
effects of cross-channel price integration on product sales. Prior research mostly focuses on 
channel integration (Gallino and Moreno 2014; Gao and Su 2016) or consumer experiences (Bell 
et al. 2017; Cao and Li 2015; Saghiri et al. 2017), with a general assumption that multi-channel 
consumers would not encounter inconsistencies related to price discrepancies. This research 
sheds new light on the unique influences of price integration. In particular, it highlights the 
dynamic effects of two prevalent pricing strategies, along with the two contrasting mechanisms 
(i.e., pricing constraint and pricing consistency).  
Third, the research also contributes to pricing literature, by highlighting the contrasting 
characteristics of channel-specific versus cross-channel price integration models. Prior multi-
channel pricing literature emphasizes the costs and benefits of a channel-specific pricing strategy 
(Cavallo 2017; Kireyev et al. 2017; Vogel and Paul 2015; Yan and Pei 2011) and consumers’ 
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perceptions of price discrimination (Bolton et al. 2003; Cuellar and Brunamonti 2014; Fassnacht 
and Unterhuber 2016; Wu et al. 2012; Xia et al. 2004). I extend these insights by addressing two 
pricing strategies in a multi-channel context. Consistent with prior literature, I show that a 
channel-specific pricing model works better in the short run, because the inability to price the 
products according to the channel-specific context has an immediate effect on product sales; 
while in the long run, cross-channel price integration is preferable, because customers have a 
more consistent, seamless shopping experience the cross-channel price integration supports, 
which would outweigh the incentives looking for lower price alternatives. In other words, 
channel-specific pricing model features the price-orientated model that attracts consumers 
through competitive prices, and cross-channel price integration emphasizes the service-oriented 
model that attracts consumers by improving their shopping experiences.  
2.8.1 Managerial Implications 
Pricing strategies are critical, with ramifications for retailers’ performance, market 
competition, and consumer relationships. Retailers need to synergize their marketing mix across 
all available channels, but doing so might decrease price competitiveness and limit their pricing 
flexibility (Grewal et al. 2010; Kireyev et al. 2017). Our research establishes that it takes time for 
consumers to grow accustomed to cross-channel price integration, so price integration might hurt 
firms in the short run, due to their loss of pricing flexibility. In a sense, firms that focus on long-
term benefits should integrate product prices across channels, but if they aim to maintain 
competitiveness through providing a more flexible pricing policy, firms should stick to a 
channel-specific pricing strategy. 
In addition, firms should consider the boundary conditions that determine the effectiveness 
of price integration, such as product type (with vs. without coordinated services), and target 
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consumer segments (experience- vs. price focused consumers). Price integration improves a 
consistent shopping experience, which is more important for products with high search costs, 
such as those involving services and experience-based offerings. Minimizing costly search 
efforts for these products by applying a cross-channel price integration can increase the retailer’s 
competitiveness. Furthermore, price integration provides a more consistent shopping 
environment without cross-channel price discrepancies, yet it is beneficial only if the target 
segments have a stronger preference toward better experiences than better prices.  
2.8.2 Limitations and Further Research Directions 
Some limitations of this study suggest some worthwhile research opportunities. First, I 
focus on channel integration by one retailer, though manufacturers’ cross-channel integration 
decisions also might affect consumers’ choices of retailer. Some manufacturers adopt a channel 
integration strategy that incorporates all touchpoints, including retailers. For example, Apple 
products list the same retail prices, across all retailers and Apple stores. Such manufacturer-level 
integrated multi-channel pricing might reduce consumers’ incentives for between-seller searches 
or competition. Research that focuses on manufacturers’ cross-channel pricing strategy could 
deepen understanding of consumers’ responses. 
Second, beyond the influences on product sales, it would be helpful to investigate the 
effects on margins. As posited in prior literature, a key advantage of channel-specific pricing is 
that sellers can increase their margin rates among less price sensitive customers (Cuellar and 
Brunamonti 2014; Kireyev et al. 2017). In contrast, sellers that integrate cross-channel prices 
lose pricing flexibility, which might reduce their profitability. I indirectly infer the impacts on 
profits, according to overall revenue; data limitations prevent us from addressing margin 
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outcomes directly. Therefore, continued research should identify the profitability implications 
when retailers implement a cross-channel price integration strategy. 
Third, I take a holistic perspective; further research might consider specific influences on 
consumers’ perceptions and migration behaviors. Investigating the consumer’s shopping journey 
in a cross-channel price integration context represents a promising path toward a greater 
understanding of consumers and their behaviors in this multi-channel settings. 
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APPENDIX A: Example of Sponsored Advertisements list (Essay 1) 
Notes. Sponsored advertisements are vertically listed (within the red rectangle) in the separate column with organic results.
Am Example of Search-Result Webpage
Figure A1
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APPENDIX B: The MCMC Algorithm (Essay 1) 
We ran the MCMC chain for 80,000 iterations and used the every 40th of the last 40,000 
iterations to compute the mean and standard deviation of the posterior distribution of the model 
parameters, in the application presented in the paper. We report below the MCMC algorithm for 
the simultaneous model of click-through rate, conversion rate, and price rank. 
As specific, we define  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1. Draw  and  
The likelihood function of the number of clicks nij and number of purchases mij is 
, 
where  and  
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We use Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a random walk chain to generate draws of 
. Let  denote the previous draw; then  the next draw is given by 
, 
with the accepting probability given by 
 
is a draw from the density MVN ( ). 
 
Step 2. Draw  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then a ~ MVN(A, B) 
 
Step 3. Draw . 
 
 
 
 
 
Then  
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Step 4. Draw  
 
 
,  
 
, ,  
, 
, ,  
, 
,  
Then,  
 
Step 5. Draw  
The likelihood function is  
, 
where  and  
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We use Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a random walk chain to generate draws of 
. Let  denote the previous draw; then  the next draw 
is given by 
 
with the accepting probability given by 
 
is a draw from the density MVN ( ). 
 
Step 6. Draw , similar to step 5. 
 
Step 7. Draw  and . 
Let ,  
then ;  
Let ,  
then ; 
Let ,  
then ; 
Let ,  
then . 
 
Step 8. Draw  
 
 
 
Then  ~ MVN (A, B) 
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Step 9. Draw ω 
,  
where , ,  and  
 
Then,  
 
Step 10. Draw , similar to step 8. 
 
Step 11. Draw , similar to step 8. 
 
Step 12. Draw , similar to step 8. 
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APPENDIX C: MCMC Diagnosis (Essay 1) 
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APPENDIX D: Task Descriptions for Participants Used in Study 2 (Essay 1) 
 
Search and buy: 
Assume you recently adopted a cute kitty and would like to buy a cat stand. After searching 
the keyword "Cat Stand" on one of your favorite online shopping websites, 7 advertisements pop 
out.  
 
Among all the 7 advertisements, you are able to click the advertisements linking to the 
detailed product page. After clicking on one advertisement, you will be led to the detailed page 
of the product you clicked. You could choose to 1) buy the product, or 2) return to the main page. 
 
Your task is to evaluate the product information and select the worthiest deal to buy.  
 
Search-only: 
Assume you recently adopted a cute kitty and would like to buy a cat stand. After searching 
the keyword "Cat Stand" on one of your favorite online shopping websites, 7 advertisements pop 
out.  
 
Among all the 7 advertisements, you are able to click the advertisements linking to the 
detailed product page. After clicking on one advertisement, you will be led to the detailed page 
of the product you clicked. You could choose to 1) proceed to the next step, or 2) return to the 
main page. 
 
Your task is to collect as much information as possible, and estimate the price of a relating 
new product. 
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APPENDIX E: Example Webpages Used in Study 2 (Essay 1) 
 
FIGURE E1
Example Search Advertisements
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Example After-Click Product Page
Figure E2
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APPENDIX F: Joint Distributions of Matched Samples (Essay 2) 
 
Figure F1
Joint Distributions of Covariances between the Matched Groups
Notes. The figures display the joint distribution of the 27 variables that were used in sample matching, and the joint distributions are divided into 1184 stratas.  
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APPENDIX G: Unobserved Factors for GSC (Essay 2) 
 
Figure G1
Estimated Unobserved factors
Notes. Factors selected based on leave-one-out-cross-validation.  
